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FIFTY-ONE FLOWERS: POST-PERPETUITIES WAR LAW AND
ARKANSAS'S ADOPTION OF USRAP
Lynn Foster*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Let a hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred schools of thought con-
tend "'
As everyone knows, the fearsome Rule Against Perpetuities ("Rule") is
in trouble.2 This classic, common law rule, which voided future interests that
* Arkansas Bar Foundation Professor of Law at the University of Arkansas at Little
Rock William H. Bowen School of Law. I wish to thank Stella Phillips, Class of 2007, for
assisting in the research for this article, and Professor Michael Flannery, Professor Emeritus
L. Scott Stafford, William Haught, Renee Brida, and Anthony A. "Tony" Hilliard for review-
ing previous drafts. Additional thanks go to the very patient and cooperative editors of the
Law Review, Joi Leonard, Michael Muskheli, and Jodie Hill. Without their assistance, this
article would not be available so timely after Arkansas's enactment of USRAP. All errors are
my own, and as John Chipman Gray said, "There is something in the subject which seems to
facilitate error." JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES xi (4th ed. 1942).
1. Mao Zedong. This is the translation of a line from a poem quoted by Mao as an
indication of the type of healthy intellectual debate and free exchange of diverse ideas he
wanted to take place concerning governmental and social issues during the mid-1950s. Hun-
dred Flowers Campaign, in WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/HundredFlowersCampaign (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). The
variety of different types of flower blossoms here symbolizes the evolving variety and diver-
sity of perpetuities law at the present time.
2. When I first told a colleague (not a property teacher) of my intention to write this
article, she said, "That's an article no one will ever read." It may be that no one reads articles
about the Rule, but it cannot be said that no one writes them. The reform and decline of the
Rule are well-documented. Most of the recent scholarship concerning the Rule is cited herei-
nafter, but several recent articles are particularly notable. See generally David M. Becker, If
You Think You No Longer Need to Know Anything About the Rule Against Perpetuities, Then
Read This!, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 713 (1996) (pointing out common drafting provisions that
violate the Rule, and suggesting alternatives that work--"preventive perpetuities com-
pliance'-under the common law Rule, and thus also under the Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities); Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP
Has No Friends-An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000) (tying the decline of
the Rule to various current societal norms and attitudes); Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2588 (2003) (arguing in favor of perpetual trusts and
discussing the various ways in which states have changed or abolished the Rule); Robert H.
Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical
Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005) (presenting the results of a
study demonstrating that states that abolish the Rule and levy no income tax on trusts are
attracting significant increases in out-of-state trust business); Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional
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remained nonvested past a certain period of time after their creation, exists
pristine and unreformed in only one state today: Alabama. The Rule fell
prey to several factors: its own shortcomings, changes in the nature of the
property affected by the Rule, changes in tax law, and significant changes in
the law of trusts, which have legitimized perpetual trusts and dynasty trusts.3
After decades of "perpetuities wars," the unmodified Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) is currently the law in roughly one-third
of the states.4 Arkansas is the most recent state to adopt USRAP.5 About half
of the states have legalized dynasty or perpetual trusts. A few have com-
pletely abolished the Rule in any form. Although this unprecedented varia-
tion of perpetuities law from state to state presents risks and challenges for
estate planners, Arkansas's adoption of USRAP will provide a "safety net"
for inadvertent violations of the Rule in this state.
Part II of this article will briefly trace the Rule's history, from its crea-
tion until the present, and discuss the reasons both for its existence and its
decline, along with the rise of perpetual trusts. It will provide the current
status of the Rule in the states, which has continued to evolve. Although it
hardly seems possible, the law of perpetuities is much more complicated
than it was twenty years ago. The Rule is not dead, but there is more varia-
Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDozo L.
REv. 2097 (2003) (discussing inefficiencies that will result from abolition of the Rule, but
concluding that they do not justify opposing the Rule's abolition).
3. In this article, the term "perpetual trust" will be used to refer to a trust that can legal-
ly last forever. The term "dynasty trust" will be used to refer to a trust that can legally last
longer than the Rule period but not forever.
4. These states are California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ore-
gon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21200-25 (West
Supp. 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-490 to 45a-496 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-
6-200 to -206 (1991); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 525-1 to 525-6 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-17-
8-1 to -6 (LexisNexis 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-3401 to -3408 (2005); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, §§ 1-11 (West Supp. 2007); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.71 to
554.78 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 501A.01 to .07 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 72-2-1001 to -1007 (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-2-901 to -907 (West 2003); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 41-15 to -22 (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-02-27.1 to 01-27.5 (1999); OR.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.950 to .975 (West 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-10 to -80 (West
2007); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-1-201 to -208 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-lA-1 to -8
(LexisNexis 2005).
5. Representative Steve Harrelson originally sponsored House Bill 1130. Representa-
tive Chris Thyer was added as cosponsor, and House Bill 1130 was enacted as Act No. 240
on March 9, 2007 (to be codified as Ark. Code Ann. §§ 18-3-101-09). Included in the bill
were three amendments to current statutes, exempting cemetery trusts from USRAP, and
amending the Uniform Simultaneous Death Statute to refer to USRAP, rather than the com-
mon law Rule. These additions are not included in the text of Appendix A, which reproduces
Act No. 240, and are outside the scope of this article.
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tion in perpetuities law among the states than at any time previously in Unit-
ed States history.
Part III of the article will explain how the common law Rule works,
and it will discuss pre-USRAP perpetuities law in Arkansas. Arkansas's
constitution forbids perpetuities.6 The Arkansas Supreme Court has inter-
preted this constitutional provision to mean that the common law Rule is
law in Arkansas. Nonetheless, six out of eight states with similar constitu-
tional provisions have enacted the USRAP.7 Thus, the fourth and fifth parts
of the article will discuss USRAP and the effect that its enactment will have
on Arkansas law. Appendix A sets out the text of USRAP. Appendix B in-
cludes a state-by-state summary of current perpetuities law. Appendix C is a
subject index of the examples illustrating how USRAP works.
Finally, many sweeping generalizations have been made about the de-
cline, death, and doom of the Rule. Is the Rule really completely dead? The
answer is "no" in the eighteen USRAP states, and essentially "no with re-
spect to nontrust property" in almost all of the rest.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
A. Its Creation
Unlike rules and doctrines such as the Rule in Shelley's Case and the
Doctrine of Worthier Title that originated in medieval times,8 the Rule is
relatively modern.9 It was first formulated by Lord Chancellor Nottingham
in the Duke of Norfolk's Case in 1682, at a time when the landed nobility
were attempting to extend their control over the disposition of their property
as far as possible into the future.' ° After 1620, executory interests were held
6. "Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a republic, and shall not
be allowed...." ARK. CONST. art. II, § 19.
7. Arizona, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming. ARiz.
CONST. art. II, § 29; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. XV, § 4; N.C. CONST. art.
I, § 34; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 22; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 30. Arizona has amended USRAP to
allow perpetual trusts, seemingly in violation of its constitution. Wyoming has the common
law Rule but allows 1000-year trusts. Oklahoma and Texas have the common law Rule along
with a cypres reform. For more information on each state, see Appendix B.
8. The Rule in Shelley's Case was recognized as early as the fourteenth century. The
Doctrine of Worthier Title also arose under the feudal system. LEWIS M. SIMES, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 20,26 (2d ed. 1966).
9. Modem for property law, that is.
10. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 49, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 960 (1682). For a very complete account of the
case and its background, see generally Herbert Barry, The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 23 VA. L.
REV. 538 (1937). For a revisionist account, see generally George L. Haskins, Extending the
Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflections on the Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 19 (1977).
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to be indestructible, unlike contingent remainders." This opened up the pos-
sibility of land being held by one family indefinitely. The Duke of Norfolk
wished to create a trust with a term of 200 years, to be paid first to himself
and his widow for their lives, then to his second son Henry and his issue. If
during Henry's life the Duke's first, mentally defective son Thomas died
and Henry became the Earl, then the trust income was to be paid to the third
son, Charles, and his issue. 2 Few would dispute the subtleness of the chan-
cellor's answer to the dilemma. Instead of a black letter rule stating a fixed
number of years that a future interest could remain nonvested, in the Norfolk
case, the chancellor tied it to the generation alive at the time the interest was
created, and he declared that if the executory interest in the third son would
either become possessory or fail during the life of the third son, it was valid.
Commentators differ as to whether the Rule was a victory for those
who wished to alienate property, or a victory for those who wished to re-
strict its alienation. 3 Subsequent cases have held that more than one life, or
a class, can be the validating life that validates an interest; that the validating
lives need not be beneficiaries; and that the gestation period can be added
onto the twenty-one years, to produce the common law rule recognizable to
us today.'
4
B. The Rule Comes to America
The Rule became law in the United States by various legal routes and
in various forms. To today's law students, who learn the Rule in a single
common law form (if they learn it at all) and who are tested on that form on
the multistate bar exam,' 5 it may come as a surprise to learn that the Rule
has existed in different versions in different states. In some states, it was
"received" into the common law by reception statutes. Other states enacted
the Rule in statutory form. A few, like Arkansas, adopted the rule into their
constitutions. 6 At the time the Rule was being adopted in the states, all
states prohibited perpetuities, but the details varied. As time went on, some
11. Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 290 (1620); see also SIMEs, supra note 8, § 122 (briefly
explaining the historic background from which the Rule arose).
12. Haskins, supra note 10, at 36.
13. Id. at 46.
14. JOHN CHIIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 182 (4th ed. 1942); SIMES,
supra note 8, § 122. For a discussion of the operation of the contemporary common law rule,
see infra the text accompanying notes 169-95.
15. Even though the Rule is not listed in the Property Outline published on the National
Conference of Bar Examiners' website, it and its exceptions and reforms take up eight pages
in the 2006 BAR/BRI Bar Review Multistate Outline for Real Property, available at
http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mbe/subjects/real-property/ (last visited Dec. 28,
2006). See also BARIBRI, BAR REVIEW MULTISTATE Real Property 20-28 (2006).
16. GRAY, supra note 14, at app. C (tracking the history of the Rule in the states).
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of the states with statutes actually repealed them in favor of the common law
rule.'
7
During the 1880s, Harvard law professor John Chipman Gray, who
perhaps little suspected the amount of misery he would cause in the lives of
countless law students, 8 and who became the most noted nineteenth-century
authority on the Rule in the United States, categorized American perpetui-
ties legislation and constitutional law into three types: (1) general, nonspe-
cific provisions that forbade perpetuities; (2) short statutes either declaring
or modifying the Rule; and (3) elaborate statutory schemes. 9 Gray also con-
structed the most popular formulation of the Rule: "No interest is good un-
less it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in
being at the creation of the interest."2°
C. Arguments in Favor of the Rule Against Perpetuities
At various times throughout its existence, modem commentators have
identified several policy reasons supporting the Rule.
Promoting the Alienability of Land. The Rule promotes the alienabil-
ity of land by preventing nonvested interests that are too remote, thereby
allowing Blackacre to be sold advantageously earlier in time than it would
be if nonvested interests in it existed.2' The Rule itself is not a rule against
direct restraints on alienation.22 Instead, the Rule promotes the alienability of
property by voiding future interests that vest too remotely, and thus it rend-
ers land more valuable and easier to sell in general.23
Striking a Balance Between Generations. Lewis Simes stated this
policy as a "fair balance" between the desires of members of the present
generation and those of the future "to do as they wish with the property
which they will enjoy. '24 The dead hand's grasp can reach out approximate-
17. SIMES, supra note 8, § 124.
18. Or then again, perhaps he did.
19. GRAY, supra note 14, § 729.
20. Id. § 201.
21. See id. § 121.
22. A restraint on alienation is a provision that prevents the owner of an interest in prop-
erty from transferring it at all, transferring it in particular ways, or transferring it to particular
persons. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 640 (1937-
1938); see also, e.g., Casey v. Casey, 287 Ark. 395, 700 S.W.2d 46 (1985) (striking down a
devise that would forfeit the testator's son's land if the testator's granddaughter ever owned,
possessed, or occupied the land, and that appeared to be imposed from spite or malice, as an
unreasonable restraint on alienation).
23. SIMES, supra note 8, § 121; see also Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1043-44 (1987).
24. SIMES, supra note 8, § 121; see also Sterk, supra note 2, at 2106.
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ly two generations beyond death, but no farther; at that point, the Rule inva-
lidates nonvested interests.2 5
Promoting Equality of Opportunity and Curbing the Concentra-
tion of Wealth. Allowing property to be held in trust forever arguably could
facilitate the concentration of wealth, widening the growing gulf between
the wealthy and the middle class and enabling beneficiaries to afford expen-
sive opportunities that are beyond the means of most persons. Such inequali-
ty of opportunity is unfair.26 This criticism applies not just to perpetual trusts
but also to taxation (or lack of taxation) of the wealthy. Recent statistics
indicate increasing economic inequality in the United States, raising the
question of whether economic inequality of opportunity is being stifled. 7
Does wealth held in perpetual trusts further fuel economic inequality? Intui-
tively, the answer seems to be "yes." As one might expect, however, there is
no real data regarding perpetual trust investments that can be examined to
evaluate this argument.28 A similar argument is that the security of a trust
income makes beneficiaries lazy because rather than becoming productive
members of society, they simply live in leisure off of their trust income. 9
Avoiding "Durational" Problems of Trusts. Professors Jesse Duke-
minier and Richard Krier identified several durational problems that could
arise as a result of allowing perpetual trusts.3 ° These problems include
changes in circumstances, trustees, and multiplication of beneficiaries.31
However, as they noted, the Uniform Trust Code ameliorates, to some ex-
tent, many of these problems. Currently, the Uniform Trust Code has been
adopted by eighteen states and the District of Columbia.
32
25. I use this phrase, as does USRAP, as shorthand for contingent remainders, executory
interests, and vested remainders subject to open.
26. Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts, Conservation Servitudes, and the Problem of the
Future, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2526 (2006); Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the
Settlor's Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 595, 623-24 (2005); Angela M. Vallario, Death by a
Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS. 141, 155-56 (1999).
27. See, e.g., KEviN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY (2002); Special Report: In-
equality in America, ECONOMIST, June 17, 2006, at 28; Special Report: Meritocracy in Amer-
ica, ECONOMIST, Dec. 29, 2004, at 22.
28. One difficulty with the debate is that data does not exist. Trusts are not registered in
most states. Their accounts are not in the public record. However, working with reports that
banks make to federal regulatory authorities, Professors Robert Sitkoff and Max Schanzen-
bach have recently published the first ever empirical study of the domestic competition for
trust funds. See generally Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 2. As trusts become more
prevalent, legislatures may wish to require them to be recorded publicly, as are deeds and
probated wills.
29. Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L.
REv. 1303, 1324-25 (2002-2003).
30. Id. at 1303.
31. Id. at 1327-39.
32. National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About
the Uniform Trust Code, available at
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Curtailing Risk-Averse Investments by Trustees. Historically, trus-
tees were limited to conservative investment venues for trust assets.33 The
modem portfolio theory, proving the advantages of diverse investments, did
not become widely accepted by lawmakers until the adoption of the Uniform
Prudent Investor Act in 1994.34 Prior to that time, trustees had no clear duty
to diversify, and clear direction from courts and legislature to avoid specula-
tion. 5 For decades, beginning around 1900, most states restricted the types
of investment allowed by statutes that specified "legal lists," which limited
trustees to low-risk, low-income-producing assets, like bonds and other debt
instruments, as opposed to riskier investments like common stock. 36 Thus,
the Rule limits the amount of time during which trust assets would have to
be used so conservatively.37
Reducing Administrative Costs. Few trustees charge no fees. Costs
connected with trust administration may also include services of attorneys,
accountants, banks, investment brokers, and the like." The Rule limits the
amount of time during which property is subject to these charges.3 9
Limiting Duration of Spendthrift Restrictions on Creditors. Most
trusts today contain spendthrift provisions that limit the rights of certain
creditors to reach trust assets in the hands of the trustee. The beneficiary of
such a trust has less of a stimulus to avoid undesirable behavior (careless-
ness in the case of a tort creditor, fiscal irresponsibility in the case of a lend-
er) because the beneficiary knows that the creditor will have no recourse
against the trustee.4' This last policy is the most recent, as spendthrift trusts
were not invented until the late nineteenth century.
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-utc2000.asp (last visited
Feb. 18, 2007).
33. Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Modern Port-
folio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REv. 87, 88-90 (1990).
34. John Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing,
81 IOWA L. REv. 641, 641-42 (1996).
35. Id. at 644-46.
36. Id.; see also, e.g., King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869) (restricting trustees to certain
types of investments).
37. Sterk, supra note 2, at 2106; see also Vernor F. Chaffin, Georgia's Proposed Dynas-
ty Trust: Giving the Dead Too Much Control, 35 GA. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (2000).
38. See, e.g., Springfield Trust Co., Fee Schedule, available at
http://www.springfieldtrust.com/fee_schedule.php (last visited Mar. 3, 2007) (showing one
trust company's rates).




D. The Move for Reform
The modem move for reform, or the first cannon fire in the fifty-year
"perpetuities wars," as some commentators have called them,4 began with
two colorfully titled companion articles by Professor W. Barton Leach pub-
lished in 1952.42 Leach criticized the Rule for its hypothetical nature, strik-
ing down interests because of events that might happen, even though some
of the hypothetical events were impossible in the real world.43 He labeled
some of the more extreme cases with names that we still use today: the Un-
born Widow, the Magic Gravel Pit, the Fertile Octogenarian, and the Preco-
cious Toddler.' Other targets of his criticism were as follows: (1) the lack of
reformation under the Rule,45 as it renders future interests invalid and does
not reform them in order to adhere to the testator's intent as much as possi-
ble; (2) the extension of the scope of the Rule to options to purchase, since
they arise in a commercial context and not as a part of attempts to establish
dynastic arrangements;46 and (3) the historic exemption of reversionary in-
terests from the Rule.47 He suggested reforms to correct these defects and
recommended either the American Law Institute, the National Conference
of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, or the American Bar Association
as the proper entity to draft an appropriate statute.48
41. The first to use the phrase was Professor Susan F. French in Perpetuities: Three
Essays in Honor of My Father, 65 WASH. L. REv. 323, 323 (1990).
42. See generally W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents,
68 L.Q. REv. 35 (1952); W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's
Reign of Terror, 65 HARv. L. REv. 721 (1951-1952) [hereinafter Reign of Terror]. Ironically,
although a professor began the campaign to reform the Rule, most of academia seems op-
posed to its abolition, in contrast to the practicing bar. Joel Dobris, Undoing Repeal of the
Rule Against Perpetuities: Federal and State Tools for Breaking Dynasty Trusts, 27
CARDozo L. REV. 2537, 2538 n.3 (2006). I would suggest that one reason for this is because
professors have to teach the Rule, year after year, in a sort of Groundhog-Day-like routine.
Articles about how to teach the Rule also proliferate. See generally Peter A. Appel, The Em-
barrassing Rule Against Perpetuities, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 264 (2004); French, supra note 41,
at 325-32; Robert J. Hopperton, Teaching the Rule Against Perpetuities in First Year Proper-
ty, 31 U. TOL. L. REv. 55 (1999); John W. Weaver, Fear and Loathing in Perpetuities, 48
WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 1393 (1991).
43. Leach, Reign of Terror, supra note 42, at 728-30.
44. Id. at 731-32. For an explanation of these hypotheticals, see infra text accompanying
notes 170-82. Professor Mechem disagreed with Leach's criticisms, characterizing Leach's
examples as "reiterated castigation of a few freak cases[,] which he has popularized by giving
them cute names." Philip Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legis-
lation, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 965, 967 (1959).
45. Leach, Reign of Terror, supra note 42, at 734-36.
46. Id. at 736-39. Reversionary interests are possibilities of reverter, rights of entry (also
known as rights of re-entry and powers of termination), and reversions.
47. Id. at 739-45.
48. Id. at 747-49.
[Vol. 29
ARKANSAS'S ADOPTION OF USRAP
Although not everyone agreed with Leach, a few states began to amend
the Rule, either by judicial decision or by statute. Pennsylvania was the first
state to adopt the "wait-and-see" approach, actually doing so before Leach's
articles were published 9.4 Wait-and-see states used actual lives in being, plus
twenty-one years, as the period during which a court would not invalidate
the future interest.50 In the late 1970s, Professor James A. Casner, Reporter
for the Restatement (Second) of Property, Donative Transfers and Harvard
colleague of Leach, proposed adding the wait-and-see reform to the new
Restatement." The debate over whether to add the reform to the Restate-
ment took place over two annual meetings. 2 Professor Richard R. Powell,
the reporter for the first property Restatement, now retired and eighty-eight
years old, attended the meeting to speak against the proposal, 53 but to no
avail, for in 1983, the Restatement (Second) of Property adopted the wait-
and-see approach,54 and by 1985, almost half of the states had done so as
well.5 5 However, the wait-and-see approach was not without its problems.
Waiting in abeyance for decades to see whether a future interest was void
was not only atypical of property law, but it also left the state of title uncer-
tain.56 Additionally, the states adopted differing approaches to determine
who the permissible group of possible "lives in being" would be.
A few states also adopted another of Leach's suggestions and allowed
courts to reform instruments in order to carry out testators' and settlors'
intents and still conform to the Rule. 57 This approach is generally known as
the "cy pres" doctrine, from the doctrine of trust law that enables courts to
reform charitable gifts if the specific term of the trust is impossible, imprac-
ticable, or illegal to carry out.58 The "cy pres" doctrine was hard to criticize
because it did enable courts to better effect the wishes of grantors, but most
courts stuck to their centuries-old reluctance to reform wills and trusts. 59 A
49. See discussion infra app. B (discussing Pennsylvania law); see also W. Barton
Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124 (1960).
50. See Becker, supra note 2, at 712-13 (presenting a more complete discussion of this
type of statute).
51. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 29, at 1307.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 (1983).
55. Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648,
1655 (1985).
56. SIMES, supra note 8, § 129.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 130. Cypres means "as nearly as possible." Id.
59. The common law Rule is that a court may not reform a will or testamentary trust
because of mistake. Witt v. Rosen, 298 Ark. 187, 189, 765 S.W.2d 956, 957 (1989); see also
generally John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground
of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law? 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982) (criticiz-
ing the common law rule).
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handful of states enacted reforms that addressed specific fact patterns and
were intended to correct some of the absurd results of the Magic Gravel Pit,
the Unborn Widow, and the rest of Leach's collection of absurdities.6"
In 1986, reform of the Rule culminated in the promulgation of the Uni-
form Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. USRAP accomplishes several
reforms of the common law Rule. First, it adopts the wait-and-see approach,
but it avoids the confusion about validating lives by making the waiting
period ninety years. Second, it also adopts the "cy pres" approach in that, if
the provision still violates the Rule at the end of ninety years, courts can
reform nonvested interests that violate the common law Rule in order to best
effectuate the intent of the grantor.61 Despite criticism from some quarters,
more than half of the states have adopted USRAP.
62
E. The Decline and Fall of the Rule
The GST Tax Exemption. Ironically, the same year that USRAP was
being promulgated, Congress was passing legislation that contained within it
the seeds of the Rule's demise. In 1986, Congress enacted a major revision
to the estate-tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.63 One of the poli-
cies underlying the federal gift and estate tax, a transfer tax on the estates of
decedents, is to tax estates as they pass from generation to generation.' Prior
to 1986, decedents were able to escape the transfer tax by transferring suc-
cessive life estates across multiple generations. For example, if 0 devised in
trust for the benefit of A for life, then to B, A's estate would pay no transfer
taxes. 65 In order to close this loophole, Congress enacted the generation-
skipping transfer (GST) tax.66 Thus, in the above hypothetical, a GST tax
would be payable on all trust assets at A's death.
The GST tax rate is significant-it equals the highest rate of the estate
tax, which as of 2007, is forty-five percent.67 Although Congress imposed
the new GST tax with one hand, with the other hand it granted an exemption
from the tax. Originally the exemption amount was $1 million. In 2007, it
became $2 million, and as the legislation stands, it will increase to $3.5 mil-
lion by 2009.68 Thus, under the exemption, if 0 established a testamentary
60. See id. § 131 (containing further discussion of these scenarios).
61. UNIF. PROBATE CODE, art. II, pt. 9, subpt. 1 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 223-25 (1998).
62. See infra app. B (stating the current status of USRAP in the states).
63. Tax Refonn Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
64. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109th CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 392 (Comm. Print 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf.
65. Sitkoff& Schanzenbach, supra note 2, at 370-71.
66. I.R.C. §§ 2601-63 (2006).
67. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 2641, 2001(c)(2) (West 2007).
68. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 64, at 394.
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trust whose corpus was worth $2 million for the benefit of A for life, then to
B, A's estate will still pay no transfer taxes. When will transfer taxes ulti-
mately be paid? Usually, when the trust terminates.69 Congress intended
uniformity across the states with the GST tax and its exemption; the limit on
the GST exemption was to be the Rule, which at that point in time was the
law in all but three states.7 ° Without the Rule, a settlor could establish a trust
that lasted for generations, paying no transfer taxes. Of course, such a trust
would be subject to state and federal income taxes, but these are much less
onerous than the GST tax.7" Indeed, some states charge no income tax on
trusts. If the trust assets appreciate in value, the appreciation is exempt from
the GST tax also.72
Example 1: S establishes a trust in a state that allows perpetual trusts
and does not charge state income tax. The corpus of the trust is $2 mil-
lion. As current federal law stands, no federal transfer taxes will ever
become due on this trust as it passes from generation to generation.
The only costs of the trust will be federal income tax and the fees and
charges paid to the trustees and their employees, e.g., attorneys and
investment brokers.73
69. Sitkoff& Schanzenbach, supra note 2, at 372.
70. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 64, at 394.
71. Together, federal and state income tax of a trust may amount to approximately half
of the income; on the other hand, the GST tax is almost half of the principal.
72. One commentator estimates that with skillful drafting, in a common law Rule state a
trust starting with a corpus of $1 M, the maximum allowed, could reach as much as $1.09
billion, assuming a period of 120 years, no distribution of principal, income distributed on the
basis of need, and a six percent annual growth rate after taxes. Richard Oshins, MegatrustsM "
Representation Without Taxation, 48 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAx'N. 19-8, 9 (1990).
Oshins estimates that the same amount, transferred outside of a GST exemption trust, as part
of an estate, if taxed at the fifty percent rate every thirty years, would only reach $68 million
at the end of 120 years. Id. Sitkoff and Schanzenbach cite another estimate of trust asset
growth by Richard Nenno, who claims that with a "[five percent] after-tax growth and a GST
tax that would be levied every twenty-five years, a transfer-tax-exempt, perpetual dynasty
trust funded initially with $1 million would be worth $131,501,258 after 100 years. This
compares with $10,376,082 for an initial $1 million investment, without perpetual transfer-
tax-exempt status." Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 2, at 372 n.50 (citing RICHARD W.
NENNO, DELAWARE DYNASTY TRUSTS, TOTAL RETURN TRUSTS, AND ASSET PROTECTION
TRUSTS 176-77 (2005)).
73. Even if a state has abolished the Rule, another doctrine, the rule against accumula-
tions, might come into play here to limit the accumulation of income. Some states have either
common law or statutory rules against accumulations, which may operate independently of
the Rule. See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 100
Nw. U. L. REv. 501 (2006); Karen J. Sneddon, The Sleeper Has Awakened: The Rule Against
Accumulations and Perpetual Trusts, 76 TUL. L. REv. 189 (2001) (discussing this issue).
Arkansas has neither statutes nor case law restricting accumulations. Further discussion of the
rule against accumulations is outside the scope of this article.
20071
UALR LAW REVIEW
In 1995, Dukeminier pointed out that in a USRAP state, the new tax
laws would enable a settlor to establish a ninety-year, $1 million trust, free
of GST taxes.74 That same year, Delaware became the first state to respond
by abolishing the Rule as applied to interests in a trust. This development
was followed by what Professor Stewart Sterk termed a "race" among the
states, as a flurry of articles urged the abolition of the Rule or chronicled its
demise," and as of this writing, half of the states have abolished the Rule or
USRAP to a greater or lesser extent, most of them only with respect to
trusts.76 The race to lengthen the permissible period of trusts was also ac-
companied by the adoption of asset protection trusts and/or the repeal of
income tax in a significant number of states.77
The GST tax exemption was not the only reason for the rush to disman-
tle the Rule; as Professor Mary Louise Fellows has phrased it, the GST tax
exemption was the spark that set off the movement for perpetual trusts, but
there was plentiful "dry tinder" in place before the spark.78 What were these
tinders?
Societal Norms and Values. Fellows argues the existence of two
norms: the control of property after death and the concomitant idea that
there is nothing wrong with restricting a donee's ownership of property.79
Professor Joel Dobris also argues that numerous attitudes regarding the ag-
74. Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST
Tax: New Perils for Practitioners and New Opportunities, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 185,
205-06 (1995).
75. Sterk, supra note 2, at 2098. For articles written to persuade states to modify their
version of the Rule, see generally, e.g., Keith L. Butler, Long Live the Dead Hand: A Case
for Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Washington, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1237 (2000);
Thomas L. Stover, Why Not Repeal the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 30 COLO. LAW., 2001, at
58-60. But see generally Verner F. Chaffin, Georgia s Proposed Dynasty Trust: Giving the
Dead Too Much Control, 35 GA. L. REV. 1 (2000); Ashley Vaughan, Comment, You Can't
Take It with You: Property Rights After Death and Rethinking the Rule Against Perpetuities,
47 S. TEx. L. REv. 615 (2006) (urging cautious reform of the Rule).
76. See discussion infra app. B (explaining current state law).
77. Asset protection trusts contradict the common law rule allowing creditors access to
self-settled trusts in which the settlor is also the beneficiary. See generally Richard W. Nen-
no, Planning with Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Part 11, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
477 (2005) (discussing asset protection trust statutes). A detailed discussion of asset protec-
tion trusts is outside the scope of this article. But see infra text accompanying notes 151-62
(briefly describing asset protection trusts); see also generally Henry J. Lischer, Domestic
Asset Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479 (2000) (explaining
how asset protection trusts work); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's
Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000) (recounting state competition in the
early years of asset protection trusts).
78. Mary Louise Fellows, Why the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpe-
tual Trusts, 27 CARDozo L. REV. 2511, 2511 (2006).
79. Id. at 2512-13.
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gregation of wealth have facilitated the creation of perpetuities and have
weakened the Rule, such as "we do not mind rich people these days" and
"we are well-disposed towards trusts."80 He argues that "[m]ost plain folks
see no danger [in abolishing the Rule]."'
Perhaps the "plain folks" have not had the question squarely set before
them. The story of Nevada is interesting in this regard. Nevada's constitu-
tion prohibits perpetuities, as do the constitutions of eight other states.82 In
2002, after the Nevada legislature passed legislation authorizing perpetual
trusts, the issue of whether to amend the constitution was submitted to the
voters. Several commentators predicted the passage of the initiative. A bar
journal article by two attorneys who had worked on the legislation began as
follows:
Imagine a world where there are no state income taxes. Imagine a world
where there are no estate taxes. Imagine a world where your assets can't
be taken in a divorce. Imagine a world where your assets can't be taken
in a lawsuit. Now imagine this world can be created for your descendants
forever! 3
Apparently, this world did not appeal to the voters, for they defeated the
issue by a resounding sixty percent to forty percent vote.84 Perhaps it is the
legislators and not so much the voters who do not mind rich people.
The Success of USRAP. Even though USRAP did not lengthen the
perpetuities period more than a skilled estate planner could, and arguably
not even as much,86 it made the Rule much more "user-friendly," in the
words of one commentator.87 The fact that a complex, hard-to-understand
80. Dobris, supra note 2, at 601.
81. Id. at 604.
82. The states are Arizona, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and
Wyoming. See discussion infra app. B (containing the constitutional provisions and cita-
tions).
83. Steven J. Oshins & Judith K. Ruud, Dynasty Trusts in Nevada: Countdown to
12/01/02, 9 NEV. LAW. 18, 18 (2001) (predicting the "expected voter approval" of the "ideal
estate planning vehicle"); see also discussion infra app. B (further explaining the election in
the Nevada section).
84. National Conference of State Legislatures, Nevada Initiatives and Referenda, avail-
able at http://www.ncsl.org/ncsldb/elect98/profile.cfn?yearsel=2002&statesel=NV (last
visited Apr. 18, 2007).
85. Another of Dobris's provocative observations is that "no one is guarding the chicken
coop." Dobris, supra note 2, at 655. Arizona has a similar constitutional provision (see Ap-
pendix B), and yet Arizona allows perpetual trusts. Why has no one challenged its constitu-
tionality? Perhaps a challenge is yet to come. Only a petitioner challenging a trust for violat-
ing the Rule would have standing to challenge the statute.
86. Oshins believes that a 120-year trust can be effected "through skillful compliance
with the common-law [R]ule." Oshins, supra note 72, at 19-8 (1990).
87. Fellows, supra note 78, at 2519.
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Rule could be fit into a ninety-year pigeonhole, with reform required,
changed the perception of the Rule. "Once USRAP embraced a ninety-year
period, policymakers could begin to digest the possibility that, if you could
wait ninety years, you could wait 190 years or 380 years or forever."8
Expansion of Attorney Liability for Malpractice. Yet another devel-
opment that may have played a significant part in the Rule's downfall is the
expansion of attorney liability to will and trust beneficiaries.89 This expan-
sion has occurred in two areas: privity between the attorney and client and
the statute of limitations for bringing malpractice claims. Under the common
law, a lawyer who drafted a will or trust incompetently, causing injury, was
liable only to the lawyer's client or the client's estate. However, beginning
in 1961, with the notorious case of Lucas v. Hamm,90 states began to "relax"
the privity requirement, allowing those who would have been beneficiaries
but for the negligence of the attorney to sue in malpractice. 9' As of this writ-
ing, most states have relaxed the privity requirement to some degree. 92 Du-
keminier prophesied in 1985 that this change in the law would cause reform
of the Rule (he was foreseeing the adoption of wait-and-see and cy pres sta-
tutes). 93
Another trend has been a change in the act that begins the running of
the statute of limitations for malpractice. 94 The traditional, common law rule
places the act at the commission of the act of negligence or breach of the
contract.95 The modern trend places it later in time, either at the death of the
testator or settlor or at the time the act is actually discovered.96 The most
88. Id.
89. Sterk, supra note 2, at 2100-01.
90. See generally Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962). Ironically, even though the court extended attorney liability, it refused to find mal-
practice in the drafting of a trust that violated the Rule. Id. at 690-91; see also infra note 97
and accompanying text.
91. See, eg., Lucas, 364 P.2d at 684.
92. See Martin D. Begleiter, Attorney Malpractice in Estate Planning-You've Got to
Know When to Hold Up, Know When to Fold Up, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 193, 196-207 (1990)
(discussing state positions on this issue). Arkansas has not joined the modem trend in this
area. It moved in the other direction in 1987, enacting a statute that relieves attorneys from
liability for malpractice to persons "not in privity of contract" unless the attorney commits
fraud or the attorney identifies her potential liability in a letter sent to the client and to the
beneficiaries of the services. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-310 (Supp. 2005). But see Spencer v.
Regions Bank, 73 Ark. App. 55, 60, 40 S.W.3d 319, 323 (2001) (Griffen, J., concurring)
(opinion of Judge Wendell Griffen concurring in the judgment but criticizing this statute for
weakening clients' rights to confidentiality and the rights of intended devisees and beneficia-
ries to recover against attorneys for incompetent drafting).
93. Dukeminier, supra note 55, at 1656.
94. Begleiter, supra note 92, at 208-18.
95. Id. at 209.
96. Id. at 208-18. Arkansas remains with the probable minority, following the common
law Rule. See, e.g., Goldsby v. Fairley, 309 Ark. 380, 383, 831 S.W.2d 142, 143 (1992);
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desirable outcome from the viewpoint of avoiding malpractice claims is to
abolish the Rule entirely.
F. Arguments in Favor of Limitation or Abolition of the Rule Against
Perpetuities
Commentators have made the following arguments to support the ab-
olition of the Rule.
Complexity of the Rule. The limited imagination of trust and will
drafters often fails to envision extreme "what if" scenarios that invalidate a
future interest.97 Even though drafters commonly use savings clauses to res-
cue future interests from inadvertent violation of the Rule, inartful drafting
of such clauses may also violate the Rule, or at the very least lead to litiga-
tion. 98
Unfairness and Harshness of the Rule. The Rule applies to future in-
terests in a third party, but, illogically, not to reversionary interests. Appar-
ently, since reversionary interests were well settled by the advent of the
Rule, early English decisions exempted them from the Rule's application,
and American courts followed them.99 Further, when the Rule is applied to
invalidate a future interest, its effect frustrates the intent of the testator or
settlor. The common law Rule does not allow courts to reform provisions.'0
Free Alienation No Longer a Concern. Today, most property to
which the Rule applies is personal property, held by trustees in trust, which
may freely be sold to further the interests of the beneficiaries. In addition,
the doctrine of reinvestment permits land to be sold and the proceeds in-
vested-income can go to life beneficiaries and the principle to the remain-
dermen-if the land is unproductive.' Thus, we no longer need the Rule to
protect the alienation of land.
Moore Inv. Co., Inc. v. Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, 91 Ark. App. 102,
107, 208 S.W.3d 803, 805 (2005).
97. In Lucas v. Hamm, even though the California Supreme Court extended the privity
rule, nonetheless, it held that the attorney did not commit malpractice by drafting a trust
whose provisions violated the Rule because "an attorney of ordinary skill acting under the
same circumstances might well have 'fallen into the net [that] the Rule spreads for the un-
wary."' Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 690 (Cal. 1961) (quoting GRAY, supra note 14, at xi).
98. See, e.g., Ludwig v. AmSouth Bank of Fla., 686 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997); see also Becker, supra note 2, at 736-40 (discussing how savings clauses work and
how a single, all purpose savings clause is impossible to draft).
99. Leach, Reign of Terror, supra note 42, at 740; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4, reporter's note 3 (2000).
100. Leach, Reign of Terror, supra note 42, at 734-36.
101. Lewis M. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 713-17
(1955). On the other hand, settlors in rural states who own large amounts of real property
may well prohibit trustees from selling unproductive land in order to keep it in the family.
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Advantages of Trusts. The author of a Harvard law review note re-
futes the argument that trusts hinder donees by arguing persuasively that
dynasty and perpetual trusts "actually increase control (or at least the ability
to maintain control) by future generations."'' 2 In some states, it is possible
for a trust beneficiary, who is a co-trustee with a power of appointment, to
receive significant tax advantages, protection from unsecured and judgment
creditors, possible protection from ex-spouses, and significant control over
trust assets. 0 3 Contrast this with O's child A, who is O's devisee. If 0 leaves
an estate of $2 million to A in fee simple, A will have no spendthrift protec-
tion or protection from ex-spouses. "
Interstate Competition. Estate and trust planning and administration
is a major industry. It is estimated that $41 trillion will pass between genera-
tions between 1998 and 2052.'05 Much if not most of this property will be
administered by banks and trust companies. Sterk concludes that, faced with
these "competitive pressures," a "sensible and conscientious" legislature is
acting reasonably if it abolishes the Rule.06 It should be noted, however,
that a recent study has found that jurisdictions enacting laws allowing perpe-
tual or long-term dynasty trusts seem to significantly benefit from the
change only if they charge no income tax on out-of-state trusts. State income
tax can be a significant expense. Richard Nenno calculates as follows:
[I]f a trust, which has a California trustee, incurs a $1,000,000 long-term
capital gain, the trust must pay $240,829 of tax-$91,023 of California
income tax, $136,137 of federal income tax, and $13,669 of federal
AMT. If the trust has a Washington trustee, however, the trust must pay
only $149,806 of tax-$0 of state tax, $149,791 of federal income tax,
and $15 of federal AMT, a $91,023 savings.
102. Note, supra note 2, at 2603 (paraphrasing Oshins, who goes so far as to assert that
ownership of a beneficial interest can transfer more benefits than if the property were owned
outright).
103. Id. at 2606-07.
104. Yet another advantage of perpetual trusts is their necessity to people who elect to
have their bodies cryogenically preserved, or frozen, after death. Alcor Life Extension Foun-
dation, based in California, currently has seventy-four patients in cryopreservation. Alcor
Life Extention Foundation, About Alcor, available at
http://www.alcor.org/AboutAlcor/index.htinl, (last visited Dec. 31, 2006). At the sixth Alcor
Conference in 2006, speakers revealed a "unique Alcor Wealth Preservation Trust for Alcor
members," intended to "enable Alcor members to protect their assets while in cryopreserva-
tion." Alcor Life Extension Foundation, Sixth Alcor Conference, available at
http://www.alcor.org/conferences/2006/index.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2006); see also Al
W. King III, Freezers-Our Future Coffins?, TR. & EST., Aug. 2002, at 8.
105. John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer Estimate
Is Still Valid: A Review of Challenges and Questions, 7 J. GIFT PLAN., Jan. 2003, at 11-15,
47-50, available at http://www.bc.edu/research/swri/meta-elements/pdf/4ltrillionreview.pdf
(last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
106. Sterk, supra note 2, at 2118.
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Similarly, if a trust, which was created by a New York State resident and
is subject to New York State tax, incurs a $1,000,000 long-term capital
gain, it must pay $226,798 of tax-76,992 of New York State tax,
$138,242 of federal income tax, and $11,564 of federal AMT. If the trust
had been structured to avoid New York State tax, however, it must pay
only $149,806 of tax-$0 of state tax, $149,791 of federal income tax,
and $15 of AMT, a $76,992 savings.'
0 7
Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and
Wyoming do not tax trust income."°8 Of those states that do tax, differing
factors determine whether particular trusts are subject to tax. For example,
twenty states (including Arkansas) tax trusts created by a resident testator's
will.'09 Fourteen states (including Arkansas) tax irrevocable trusts created by
residents."0 Fifteen states (not including Arkansas) tax trusts administered
in their states."'
Enacting laws favorable to domestic asset protection trusts has also
been an arena for state competition. These trusts abrogate the common law
rule that a beneficiary of a self-settled trust, who is both the settlor and the
beneficiary, may not keep from her creditors assets that she herself can
reach-in other words, these trusts will enforce a spendthrift provision in a
self-settled trust." 2 As of February 2007, nine states have legalized domestic
asset protection trusts: Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Missouri, Nevada, Ok-
lahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Utah." 3
G. The Status of Perpetuities Law in the States Today
Prior to the GST tax exemption, three states had in effect abolished the
common law Rule with respect to trusts: Idaho, Wisconsin, and South Dako-
ta." 4 It does not appear that either Idaho or Wisconsin abolished the Rule in
107. Richard W. Nenno, Choosing and Rechoosing the Jurisdiction for a Trust, 40 ANN.
HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. § 404.5(A)(2) (2006).
108. Id. § 404.5(B)(1). Florida imposes a limited tax. Id.
109. Id. § 404.5(B)(3).
110. Id. § 404.5(B)(4).
111. Id. § 404.5(B)(5).
112. Arkansas still follows the common law rule, as codified in the Arkansas Trust Code.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-505(a) (Supp. 2005). Some commentators use the term "asset pro-
tection trust" to refer to traditional, non-self-settled spendthrift trusts. In this article, it is used
in the narrower context to refer to self-settled trusts with spendthrift provisions. If this more
customary definition of "asset protection" is used, Arkansas is not an asset protection state.
For more discussion of these issues and of Arkansas law, see Lynn Foster, The Arkansas
Trust Code: Good Law for Arkansas, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 191, 234-36 (2005).
113. Nenno, supra note 107, § 411.
114. For a summary of their current laws, see discussion infra app. B.
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order to entice investors." 5 In fact, today they retain an income tax on trusts.
Dukeminier states that perpetual trusts were "seldom created" before the
advent of the GST tax in 1986.16 However, in 1983, South Dakota abolished
the Rule as part of an "aggressive campaign to attract trust and banking po-
sitions to the State. Just a few years earlier, South Dakota had repealed its
interest rate ceiling on consumer credit cards .... [It] has cemented its trust-
friendly jurisdiction by rejecting a state income tax."
' 17
In 1995, Delaware was the first state after the enactment of the GST tax
exemption to allow perpetual trusts, citing the need to entice investors away
from South Dakota and Wisconsin." 8 Since then, nineteen states plus the
District of Columbia have enacted legislation that either (1) extends the al-
lowable perpetuities wait-and-see period beyond USRAP's ninety years, (2)
allows perpetual trusts, or (3) goes the full distance and simply repeals the
Rule. This legislation is by no means uniform, although it can be grouped
into several broad categories." 9 Put most succinctly, the following is the
status of the Rule as of this writing: one lone state, Alabama, still follows
the common law Rule unmodified by any reform doctrines. 120 One state,
Kentucky, follows the common law Rule modified by the wait-and-see doc-
trine.' 2' New York, Oklahoma, and Texas follow the common law Rule
modified by varying degrees of cy pres,22 while Iowa, Mississippi, and
Vermont follow the common law Rule modified by both cy pres and wait-
and-see.
23
A total of seven states have modified the common law Rule to permit
perpetual trusts. Of them, with respect to other interests in property, Dela-
ware and New Hampshire follow the unreformed common law Rule; 4
Maine and Maryland have adopted wait-and-see;' 25 Missouri has adopted cy
115. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 29, at 1315.
116. Id. at 1315.
117. Sterk, supra note 2, at 2101-02. In addition to loosening or abolishing the Rule,
states have taken other actions to lure out-of-state investors. Some states have enacted sta-
tutes allowing nonresident grantors to establish in-state trusts.
118. Dukeminier, supra note 74, at 208 n.54.
119. See infra app. B (containing detailed summaries and citations).
120. ALA. CODE § 35-4-4 (LexisNexis 1991).
121. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 387.215 to .216 (LexisNexis 1991).
122. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 to 9-1.3 (McKinney 2002); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 60, §§ 75-77 (West 1994); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.043 (Vernon 2004); In re
Estate of Crowl, 737 P.2d 911, 914 (Okla. 1987).
123. IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.68 (West 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1998); Mur-
phy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Sun Operating Ltd. P'ship, 747 So. 2d 260, 265 (Miss. 1999);
In re Estate of Anderson, 541 So. 2d 423, 429-30 (Miss. 1989).
124. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(b) (Supp. 2006); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 564:24
(LexisNexis 2006).
125. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101, 101-A (1999 and Supp. 2006); MD. CODE ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS §§ 11-102-103 (West 2002).
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pres,"' and Ohio follows the common law Rule modified by both cy pres
and wait-and-see. 27 Illinois has reformed the common law Rule to prevent
such excesses as the Unborn Widow and the Slothful Executor, among oth-
ers.'28 Delaware limits the perpetuities period for real property owned by a
trust to 110 years. 29 All of these states except for Missouri and Delaware
require the trust to "opt out" of the Rule.
Wyoming, with a constitutional provision forbidding perpetuities and a
"model" statutory rule that essentially codified the common law Rule, has
extended the Rule's period to 1,000 years for trusts.130 However, any real
property owned by a trust is still subject to the common law Rule's life in
being plus twenty-one years."'
California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia have
enacted USRAP with minor or no amendments.132 As of 2007, Arkansas has
joined this group.
Eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted USRAP but
have later repealed or amended it to allow for dynasty or perpetual trusts,
either automatically or by opt-out provisions. Of these preceding states, Ari-
zona, the District of Columbia, Nebraska, and Virginia allow perpetual
trusts; 13' Alaska, Colorado, and Utah 1000-year trusts; 134 Nevada allows
365-year trusts, 135 and Florida allows 360-year trusts.1
36
126. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 442.555, 456.025 (West 2000).
127. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08 (LexisNexis 2002).
128. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/4 (West 2001).
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(b) (Supp. 2006).
130. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 30; WYO. STAT. § 34-1-139 (2005).
131. WYO. STAT. § 34-1-139 (2005).
132. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21200-25 (West Supp. 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-
490 to 45a-496 (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-6-200-06 (West 1991); HAW. REv. STAT.
§§ 525-1 to 525-6 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-17-8-1 to -6 (LexisNexis 2002); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59-3401-08 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, §§ 1-11 (West Supp. 2007);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.71 to 554.78 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 501A.01 to
.07 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-1001-07 (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-2-
901-07 (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-15-22 (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ § 47-02-27.1 to 01-27.5 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.950 to .975 (West 2005); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-10-80 (West 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-1-201-08 (2004); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-1A-1-8 (LexisNexis 2005).
133. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2901(A)(3) (1994); D.C. CODE § 19-904(10) (Supp.
2006); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-2005 (LexisNexis 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3
(2003).
134. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.051 (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1102.5 (2006); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-1203 (Supp. 2006).
135. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 111.1031, 111.1035 (West Supp. 2007).
136. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.225(2)(f) (West 1994).
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The remaining states basically do not have a rule against perpetuities.
Idaho abolished the Rule in the 1950s and allows perpetual trusts. 137 New
Jersey has repealed USRAP and abolished the common law Rule to allow
perpetual trusts. 138 Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wiscon-
sin have abolished most or all of the common law Rule and allow perpetual
trusts. 139 These states have reached the far end of the spectrum. Louisiana is
not on the spectrum at all because it does not recognize the common law
future interests.
140
Some generalizations may be made with respect to current law. In most
states, the Rule still exists with respect to non-trust property, and most states
still limit restraints on alienation, even if they have liberalized the Rule. As
of this writing, the uniform alternative followed by the largest number of the
states (eighteen) is USRAP, either unamended or slightly amended. Howev-
er, if one asks how many states allow dynasty or perpetual trusts, by what-
ever means, the answer is twenty-three states and the District of Columbia.
In virtually every state that has adopted USRAP or freed the way for
perpetual trusts, there is a "before" and "after" date that will be in force for
decades, since little of the legislation is retroactive. Indeed, some states that
adopted USRAP and later switched to perpetual trusts have two before-and-
after dates--one to mark the application of USRAP to trusts executed after
the date and the second to mark the date after which perpetual trusts can be
established.' 41 Some statutes are partially retroactive.
Some aspects of the legislation raise questions. Many of the state sta-
tutes exempt trusts from the coverage of the Rule if the trustee has the pow-
er to sell trust property beyond the period of the Rule. However, it is not
uncommon for grantors to prohibit the trustee from selling real property in
the corpus of the trust if it has been in the family for generations, no matter
how unproductive it has become. Is such a trust still exempt from the Rule?
Are only part of the assets, those that can be sold, exempt? The statutes are
not clear on this point.
137. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (2003).
138. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2F-9-10 (West 2003).
139. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107.1 (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (Supp.
2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-5-4, 43-5-8 (1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West
2001).
140. Patrick H. Martin & J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana and Texas Oil and Gas Law: An
Overview of the Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 783-34 (1992).
141. See, e.g., Colorado's statute, which applies USRAP to interests and powers created
on or after May 31, 1991, except for powers of appointment created by the exercise of non-
general powers of appointment. Those powers are created when the nongeneral power was
created, unless the trust was irrevocable on Sept. 25, 1985. On the other hand, if the interest
or power was created after May 31, 2001, the new 1000-year trust statute applies. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-11-1102.5 (2006).
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Have all of the states that have extended or abolished the Rule achieved
their goals? Probably not. Simply abolishing the Rule does not guarantee
respite from federal GST taxes. States may still fall prey to the Delaware
Tax Trap. The Delaware Tax Trap, now no longer a problem in Delaware,
originated when Delaware amended the Rule to provide that whenever a
nongeneral power of appointment was exercised, the Rule period did not
"relate back" to the creation of the power (as is the case under common
law), but instead, the Rule period began to run when the power was exer-
cised. Thus, if a nongeneral power of appointment was exercised before the
period of the Rule had run, the clock would start over. Delaware thus made
it possible to create a perpetual trust, as long as successive powers were
exercised again and again during each new period of the Rule. 1
42
However, Delaware's law did not escape the eye of Congress, which
responded by enacting section 2041(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.'
This statute provided that if the donee of a power creates a new power of
appointment that can be exercised to postpone the vesting of any interest or
to suspend the absolute ownership or power of alienation of property for a
period ascertainable without regard to the date of the creation of the first
power, then the trust assets subject to the power are taxable.'" This section
of the Code applies to all states, but it is not a problem in states that follow
USRAP or the common law Rule. However, if a jurisdiction abolishes the
Rule or extends its period, and it does not have a statute prohibiting the sus-
pension of the power of alienation or does not require that a nongeneral
power be exercised within a certain period of time, then if a nongeneral
power is exercised after the perpetual trust is created and outside the period
of the common law Rule, it will incur the imposition of the GST tax on the
property subject to it.'4
Thus, after examining perpetual trust statutes enacted before 2002, Du-
keminier and Krier concluded that only in Alaska, Florida, Idaho, New Jer-
sey, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming could trusts be
established that would allow nongeneral powers to be exercised beyond the
Rule's period without falling into the Delaware Tax Trap and incurring the
GST tax. 146 Trusts in Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Virginia were still subject to the
Delaware Tax Trap. 147 Attorney Julia B. Fisher disagreed. The same year,
she stated that trusts in Alaska, Illinois, Maryland, Maine, New Jersey,
Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin would not fall into the Delaware Tax
142. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 29, at 1332.
143. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3) (2006).
144. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 29, at 1333.
145. Id. at 1333-34.
146. Id. at 1333 n.127.
147. Id. at 1333 n.128.
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Trap, but Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Rhode Island, and Virginia
would.'48 Reviewing statutes in 2006, Daniel G. Worthington placed Dela-
ware, Idaho, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin in the first group. His second group consisted of Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Ne-
braska, Nevada, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming.'49 Clearly, there is little agreement or certainty in this area of the
law. Richard Nenno contends that if the IRS interprets section 2041(a)(3) to
require an ending "period" to avoid the application of the Delaware Tax
Trap, then the period will be no longer than the USRAP period of ninety
years.'
50
Assuming the state 'offers perpetual, GST tax-free, state income tax-
free, asset protection trusts, may Arkansans freely take advantage of such
trusts? With respect to income tax, an Arkansas resident must pay income
tax on any trust established by will of a resident, or by an inter vivos trust
created by a resident, even if the trust is located in another state.' 5' With
respect to asset protection trusts, the answer is even more problematic. Do-
mestic asset protection trusts (DAPTs) do not yet have any kind of track
record in the courts,'52 but they are vulnerable to attack on several grounds.
First, if the settlor's actions constitute "badges of fraud" under state fraudu-
lent transfer statutes, the trust will not be able to withstand a creditor's at-
tack."'53 Second, under the Full Faith and Credit provision of the United
States Constitution,'54 a court of a DAPT state must recognize the judgments
of non-DAPT states. 5  Third, if a settlor/beneficiary declares bankruptcy,
the recent bankruptcy reforms'56 expand the lookback period to ten years for
DAPTs created with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. 57 Fi-
nally, creditors could argue that the Contracts Clause of the United States
148. Julia B. Fisher, Dynasty Trusts: Problems and Drafting Considerations, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY, ADVANCED ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES 67-68 (Feb. 21-23, 2002).
149. Daniel G. Worthington, Perpetual Trust States-The Latest Rankings, TR. &
ESTATES., Jan. 2007, at 59, 60.
150. Nenno, supra note 107, § 404.4(D)(6) (recounting informal discussions with the
IRS).
151. ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-201 (Michie Rep. 1997).
152. A Westlaw search in Allstates and Alifeds for "asset protection trusts" revealed no
cases involving DAPTs, and indeed only approximately ten cases involving offshore asset
protection trusts.
153. Duncan E. Osborne, Jack E. Owen, Jr. & Arthur T. Catterall, Asset Protection: Trust
Planning, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR LARGE ESTATES 213,244
(Nov. 13-17, 2006).
154. UNITED STATES CONST. art. IV, § 1.
155. Osborne, Owen & Catterall, supra note 153, at 249-50.
156. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(c) (West 2007).
157. Osborne, Owen & Catterall, supra note 153, at 254.
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Constitution5 ' is violated by DAPT statutes because they render a debtor's
obligation illusory since the debtor can evade his debts simply by creating a
DAPT. 59 This issue has not yet been tested with respect to Arkansas.
160
If the trust corpus is real estate located in Arkansas, a trust adminis-
tered out of state most likely would not work either. Again, the state where
the real estate is located is the state whose law applies under traditional
choice of law rules.' 6' However, an Arkansan with a trust corpus of personal
property wishing to take advantage of lower income tax rates and/or statutes
that allow a trust to last hundreds of years should be able to shop among the
growing number of states that are trying to lure investors to their banks and
trust companies. In the words of two experts,
[t]here is no substantial experience or precedent that provides guidance
to the lawyers and trustees involved in creating, administering and inter-
preting perpetual trusts, and many of the traditional practices that work
well for trusts of relatively short duration may be, at best, inappropriate
and ineffective or, at worst, detrimental and inconsistent with the trus-
tee's fiduciary duties for trusts of unlimited duration. 1
62
H. Will the Pendulum Swing Back?
The estate and gift taxes and GST taxes are slated for abolition in 2010,
but beginning in 2011, unless Congress adopts additional legislation, the
pre-2001 Tax Act law will once again be in effect, and the three transfer
taxes will be restored. Congress never intended to exempt the GST tax for-
ever; when it enacted the exemption, all but three states enforced some ver-
sion of the Rule. What if Congress removes the GST tax exemption or
amends the estate tax to tax trust assets as they pass through each genera-
tion? Even if settlors stopped creating perpetual trusts, it is doubtful that
states would re-enact the Rule. One commentator has proposed a federal
158. UNITED STATES CONST. art. I, § 10.
159. Osborne, Owen & Catterall, supra note 153, at 257.
160. It can be argued that Arkansas has a public policy against self-settled, spendthrift
trusts, as evidenced by the legislature's enactment of Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-
73-505(a)(2) (allowing creditors to reach a revocable, self-settled spendthrift trust) and court
of appeals precedent that holds a spendthrift trust whose settlor was a co-trustee and the sole
beneficiary void as against creditors. Halliburton Co. v. E.H. Owen Family Trust, 28 Ark.
App. 314, 323-24, 773 S.W.2d 453, 457-58 (1989).
161. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 301 (rev. 2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 2006).
162. Mark J. Bradley, How to Enhance the Value of a Child's Inheritance, AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, 90 ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY, ESTATE PLANNING IN DEPTH 1303, 1306 (2000) (quoting Thomas P. Swee-
ney & Malcolm A. Moore, Perpetual Trusts: Dynasty or Disaster? Will Beneficiaries Be
Happy Campers or Plaintiffs?, AM. C. OF TR. & EST. COUNS., (Oct. 15, 1999)).
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Rule.'63 Although unlikely in today's political climate, this might be possi-
ble in a future in which the federal deficit worsens. Professor Dobris has
offered a panoply of "termination tools," such as "oppressive taxation," a
"bureau of trust enforcement," and "a Sarbanes-Oxley for perpetual
trusts.' ' "6 Dobris noted the break between practitioners and professors on the
issue of the abolition of the Rule. 165 It may be that professors, freed from the
duty to do their best for their clients and from economic dependence on fees,
can more easily sit back and view the larger picture. On the other hand, it
may be that professors are reluctant to support the abolition of that which
many of them have taught for so long.'66 Dukeminier and Krier proposed a
state statutory solution: easing the termination of perpetual trusts by chang-
ing traditional trust law. They proposed several alternatives-giving a court
the power to terminate a trust if it is advantageous to a remote generation of
beneficiaries, terminating a trust after a given period of time, allowing re-
mote beneficiaries to modify or terminate the trust, and giving the trustee
power to terminate the trust. 167 They announced a "great turning point" in
trust law, stating that "Congress has come to be in charge of trust dura-
tion.
, 168
III. THE COMMON LAW RULE AND CURRENT ARKANSAS LAW
A. The Scope of the Rule: Which Interests?
The common law Rule applies to contingent remainders, vested re-
mainders subject to open, and executory interests. It applies to most types of
powers of appointment'69 and has been applied in a number of states, includ-
ing Arkansas, to non-donative interests, such as rights of first refusal and
options to purchase. The Rule does not apply to present interests or estates,
reversionary interests (those retained in the grantor, including reversions,
rights of entry, and possibilities of reverter), indefeasibly vested remainders,
vested remainders subject to divestment, and presently exercisable general
163. See generally John G. Shively, Note, The Death of the Life in Being-The Required
Federal Response to State Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 371
(2000).
164. Dobris, supra note 42, at 2541-43.
165. Id. at 2538 n.3.
166. For articles on teaching the Rule, see supra note 42.
167. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 29, at 1339-42; see also generally Tate, supra note
26, at 605-611, 620-26 (evaluating Dukeminier's and Krier's proposals in light of indirect
evidence of testators' intentions in establishing dynasty and perpetual trusts and concluding
that they "effectively transfer the settlor's freedom to the beneficiaries.")
168. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 29, at 1343.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 184-89 for more discussion of powers of ap-
pointment under the Rule.
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powers of appointment not subject to a condition precedent. It applies to
non-charitable trusts and trusts that are only partially charitable, but not at
all to wholly charitable trusts. It is a rule of property, and not of construc-
tion, which means that courts may not choose not to apply it. 171 Unlike most
rules of construction, the Rule operates to defeat the intent of the testator or
settlor.171
B. How the Rule Works
The period of the Rule begins to run at the time the interest in question
is created. In the case of a will, a testamentary trust, or a revocable trust, this
is at the death of the testator or settlor. In the case of a deed, it is at the time
of the delivery of the deed. In the case of an irrevocable inter vivos trust, it
is the time the trust comes into existence. However, in the case of a future
interest or power of appointment created by a power of appointment, in most
cases the date of creation of such an interest or power "relates back" to the
date of the creation of the original power of appointment. When applying
the Rule, the court stands at that moment in time, looks at the future inter-
ests and powers of appointment created by the instrument, and determines
whether there is even the remotest possibility that the interests will not vest
indefeasibly (in the case of remainders), become possessory (in the case of
executory interests), or be exercised (in the case of options or powers of
appointment) within twenty-one years after the deaths of all lives in being at
that moment in time. If the remotest possibility exists, the interest or power
is invalidated.
Example 2: S devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay in-
come to A for life, then the corpus to A's children who reach the age of
twenty-five. At S's death, A has two children ages five and ten. A's
children have contingent remainders. They must reach the age of twen-
ty-five in order for their interests to vest indefeasibly. In addition, A
may have more children, thus adding more members to the class. Con-
sequently, at A's death, the class of children will not be indefeasibly
vested. The latest this could occur, if A had a child the day of his
death,172 would be twenty-five years after A 's death. Therefore, the re-
mainder to A's children is void. What if at S's death A has two children
ages five and twenty-five? Under the "all-or-nothing" rule, if the in-
terest of any potential class member might vest too remotely, the entire
170. Otter Creek Dev. Co. v. Friesenhahn, 295 Ark. 318, 321, 748 S.W.2d 344, 346
(1988); Bishop v. Williams, 221 Ark. 617, 618, 255 S.W.2d 171, 172 (1953).
171. First Ala. Bank of Montgomery v. Adams, 382 So. 2d 1104, 1107 (Ala. 1980).
172. What if A's child was born posthumously? The common law Rule adds a gestation
period to the twenty-one years if it is necessary.
2007]
UALR LAW REVIEW
class gift violates the Rule. Thus, the gift to both children is still
invalid. "'
One difficulty law students have when they are learning how to apply
the Rule is realizing that the point in time when the interest is created can
render an interest valid or invalid.
Example 3: S established an irrevocable trust paying income to his
children for life, then to divide the corpus among his grandchildren. S
has two children and three grandchildren. The grandchildren have
vested remainders subject to open because more grandchildren may be
born-since S has living children-and thus, the grandchildren's in-
terest is subject to the Rule. Their interests will vest indefeasibly when
the last of S's children dies. Since S has not named the children in the
trust, the children must be considered as a class. They cannot be used
as validating lives because S could have another child after the trust is
established. Thus, the grandchildren's interest is invalidated under the
Rule.
Example 4: S devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay in-
come to his children for life, then to divide the corpus among his
grandchildren. At S's death, he is survived by two children and three
grandchildren. The grandchildren have, as above, vested remainders
subject to open, and, as above, these are subject to the Rule. Their in-
terest will vest indefeasibly when the last of S's children dies, but here,
since S is dead, he can have no more children. Therefore, the class of
children is a valid validating life for the grandchildren, and the grand-
children's interest is valid under the Rule.
Another difficulty students have is in how to look for the "life in be-
ing"-called herein a validating life-that will make an interest valid. This
difficulty has not been confined to students-two of the greatest of the
Rule's authorities, Professors Waggoner and Dukeminier disagreed over the
issue of how to determine the appropriate pool of lives in which to look for a
validating life. Dukeminier took issue with the Restatement (Second) of
Property's pool of lives174 and argued that possible validating lives could
only be those that were "causally related" to the vesting of the future inter-
ests in question.'75 Waggoner, who later championed the ninety-year waiting
173. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. H (amended 1990), Subsidiary
Common-Law Doctrines: Whether Superseded by This Act, 8B U.L.A. 256 (200 1).
174. Dukeminier, supra note 55, at 1648, 1674-1701.
175. Id. at 1709-13.
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period of USRAP, thought that Dukeminier's approach was too narrow and
suggested that "[e]liminating people from the world at large, focusing atten-
tion on persons connected in some way to the transaction, and asking
whether there is any person in this group who satisfies the real test" was the
appropriate way to identify possible validating lives.
17 6
Students often fail to grasp that a validating life need not be a benefi-
ciary, need not even be named in the instrument, and may be a class instead
of an individual. In addition, an instrument with more than one future inter-
est may need more than one validating life for all interests to be valid.
Example 5: S devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay in-
come to S's sister A for life, then to A's children for life, and at the
death of A's children, to distribute the corpus to S's surviving children.
At S's death, A is alive and has two children. S has two children. All fu-
ture interests here are valid The validating life for A's children's
vested remainder subject to open is A. At her death her children's life
estate will vest indefeasibly and become possessive at the same mo-
ment. The validating life for S's children's contingent remainder is S's
children themselves. By the death of the last of S's children, we will
know whether their remainders have vested or failed In this example,
the two nonvested interests have two different validating lives-A and
S's children.
Another aspect of the Rule that is difficult for novices to see is its
"what-if' nature. The Rule requires courts to examine future interests at the
time of their creation and to declare their validity or invalidity at that time,
not having to wait for future developments. The courts look for possible
events that could delay vesting of future interests beyond the Rule's time
limit. If there is the slightest possibility that such an event might occur, it
invalidates the future interest no matter how improbable the event is. Profes-
sor Leach assigned the names to the following events that, although improb-
able (to varying degrees) in real life, nonetheless have caused courts to inva-
lidate future interests because of the possibility of their occurrence:
The Fertile Octogenarian: S's testamentary trust directs income to his
sister A, an eighty-five-year-old widow, for life, then to A's son B for life,
then to terminate the trust and pay the corpus to A's surviving grandchildren.
The gift to the grandchildren is invalid under the Rule because after S's
death A might have more children, who would die more than twenty-one
176. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Perspective on Wait-and-See, 85 COLUM.
L. REv. 1714, 1717 (1985). For Dukeminier's final rejoinder, see generally Jesse Dukeminier,
A Response by Professor Dukeminier, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1730 (1985).
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years after B. Thus, the grandchildren's interest might not indefeasibly vest
within twenty-one years after B's death. '77
The USRAP Comments refer to the assumptions underlying this sub-
sidiary doctrine of the Rule as the "conclusive presumption of lifetime fertil-
ity."' 7 8 It extends to both sexes and all ages.
The Precocious Toddler: S's testamentary trust directs income to B
for life, remainder to such grandchildren of B who were living at S's death,
or who were born within five years after S's death and reach the age of
twenty-one. The contingent remainder to the grandchildren is invalid under
the Rule because B could have a child after S's death, who then gave birth
to a grandchild of B within five years of S's death, but the grandchild would
not reach the age of twenty-one within twenty-one years of S's death. Ob-
viously, in the world of the Rule, if one-hundred-year-old persons can give
birth, why not three-year-olds.. 9
The Unborn Widow: T directed by a testamentary trust, "To pay in-
come to A for life, then to A's widow for life, then to terminate the trust and
pay the assets to A's surviving children." The gift to the children is invalid
under the Rule because after T's death A might remarry to someone born
after T's death, who might not die until more than twenty-one years after A,
and A might have children who are born after T's death. 1
80
The Magic Gravel Pit: T's testamentary trust directed that trustees
administer the workings of gravel pits until they were exhausted (if worked
at the then rate, they would have been exhausted four years after T's death),
and then pay over all trust assets to T's issue. The gift is invalid under the
Rule because there is no guarantee that the pits will be exhausted within
twenty-one years of lives in being at T's death. '81
The Slothful Executor: T's will devises $1 million to A, "after my es-
tate is probated." The probate of T's estate may not be complete more than
177. Leach, Reign of Terror, supra note 42, at 732. Of all of the extremes of the Rule,
given advances in medical science, this one is approaching reality. The origin of the fertile
octogenarian rule is the story of Sarah in the Bible, who gave birth when she was ninety years
old. Gen. 17:17; see also Great-Grandmother, Sixty-Two, Gives Birth, CBS NEWS, Feb. 20,
2006, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/19/national/main1330442.shtml
(last visited Dec. 28, 2006) (the child was her twelfth); Colette Keane, Teacher, Sixty-Five,
Becomes World's Oldest Mother, IRISH EXAMINER, Apr. 10, 2003, available at
http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2003/04/10/story489834519.asp (last visited Dec. 28,
2006) (the mother, a retired teacher, was from India, where the life expectancy of women is
sixty-three; the baby was fertilized in vitro); Romanian Woman Gives Birth at Sixty-Six, BBC
NEWS, Jan. 16, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4179057.stm (last
visited Dec. 28, 2006) (the mother underwent fertility treatments for nine years).
178. UN1F. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § l(a)(2), cmt. C., Wait-and-See-
Nonvested Property Interests Whose Validity Is Initially in Abeyance, 8B U.L.A. 245 (2001).
179. Leach, Reign of Terror, supra note 42, at 732-33.
180. Id. at 731.
181. Idat731-32.
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twenty-one years after the death of all people alive at T's death, and there-
fore A's springing executory interest is invalid 
182
The Rule's logic does not come easy to some people.'83 Some types of
transfers, while not violating policy reasons underlying the Rule, nonethe-
less are invalidated: to A for life, then to A's children who reach the age of
twenty-two. A might have a child the day before her death, that is, after the
creation of the future interest, and that child's interest would not vest inde-
feasibly until more than twenty-one years after A's death. This transfer nei-
ther restricts the alienability of property nor holds property in the control of
the "dead hand" for too long-A's children will either receive the property
in fee simple absolute or their interests will fail within twenty-two years
after A's death, if the children themselves die. But, the Rule voids their in-
terests.
The Rule becomes most complex when it applies to powers of ap-
pointment, which are utilized extensively in trusts. A power of appointment
is not an interest in property, but the power to designate someone as the
owner of an interest in property. 84 Powers of appointment cannot be dis-
cussed without using special terminology, which is summarized herein. The
holder of a power is a "donee." A power of appointment is not a fiduciary
interest, and a trustee with the power to administer a trust or to distribute
trust assets or income is not a donee. However, the creator of a power, a
"donor," may create a trust out of her own property, make herself a benefi-
ciary, and reserve for herself a power of appointment over the beneficial
interests of the trust property. Powers of appointment fall into two catego-
ries: general powers and nongeneral, or special, powers.185 A general power
is one that may be exercised in favor of either the donee, the donee's estate,
the donee's creditors, or the donee's estate's creditors. A nongeneral power
is one that cannot be exercised in favor of any of the preceding four enti-
ties." 6 The property subject to the power is "appointive property." Possible
recipients of the appointive property are "objects of the power," and those
persons who will receive the appointive property if the power is never exer-
cised are "takers in default." Powers of appointment may of course be held
182. Dukeminier seems to have given this situation its name. Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Ken-
tucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 KY. L.J. 3, 3 (1960-61).
183. One of my former students would repeatedly visit my office while studying the Rule
and declaim "White men can't RAP." Of course, it was white men who invented RAP.
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 17.1
(1998).
185. The Restatement (Third) of Property uses the "nongeneral," rather than the older,
"special" form. This article will follow the Restatement convention.




by trustees, in which case they are called fiduciary powers of appointment
and are usually nongeneral.
Example 6: S creates a trust. S is a co-trustee and the beneficiary. The
trust gives S a life income in the trust property, and the remainder of all
trust assets to whomever S devises, otherwise the remainder will pass
to S's son. S is both the donor and the donee of the power. It is a gen-
eral power because S can exercise it in favor of himself or anyone else,
and thus, the property subject to the power will be taxable to S's es-
tate, unless S's power is subject to an ascertainable standard or the
property covered by the power is comparatively small. 187 It is a testa-
mentary power because S can exercise it only by will. S's son is the
taker in default.
Example 7: S creates a trust. The trust gives S's son A a life income in
the trust property, with the power to appoint the trust assets to whoever
of A's descendants A names in his will, otherwise the remainder will
pass to S's issue. S is the donor of the power, and A is the donee. A has
a nongeneral power because A cannot exercise it in favor of himself,
his estate, or the creditors of either. It is testamentary because it can
be exercised only by will. A's descendants are the appointees of the
power. S's issue are the takers in default.
The Rule applies not only to powers of appointment, but also, in a
second layer of analysis, to any future interests or powers of appointment
created by the holder of a power. Thus, when analyzing powers of appoint-
ment, two questions must be asked: (1) is the power valid? and (2) is its
exercise valid? In the case of presently exercisable, general powers of ap-
pointment, unless they are subject to a condition precedent, they simply do
not fall under the Rule because they are the equivalent of a fee simple own-
ership. In the case of such powers that are subject to a condition precedent,
the power is valid if the condition is either met or rendered impossible to be
met within the period of the Rule. In the case of general testamentary pow-
ers and nongeneral powers, the powers themselves are valid if they are cer-
tain to be exercised or to terminate within the Rule's period.'88
What about the validity of the exercise of a power of appointment?
When the Rule starts to run again depends on the type of power. In the case
of a general, inter vivos power of appointment, because the donee can trans-
187. See 26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(1)-(2) (2006). Tax aspects of powers of appointment are
outside the scope of this article.
188. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. D, Sections l(b)(1) and l(c)(1):
Powers of Appointment That Are Initially Valid, 8B U.L.A. 246-48 (2001).
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fer the appointive property by deed or by will at any time, to whomever he
wishes, he has the equivalent of a fee simple interest. Therefore, the Rule
will start to run from the exercise of the power and not the time of its crea-
tion. For other types of powers, it "relates back" to the time of the creation
of the power. Some states have adopted a "second-look" exception that
takes into account facts at the time of the creation of the power in order to
validate some exercises of powers that would otherwise be void.189
Example 8: S devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay in-
come to her daughter A for life, with a general, inter vivos power of
appointment over the corpus, otherwise to X. A sets up an irrevocable
trust, with the income from Blackacre to go after A's death to her
children for life, and then twenty-one years after A's death, Blackacre
is to be divided among all of her children. This disposition is valid un-
der the Rule. A's power is valid Because it is a presently exercisable,
general power, it does not fall under the Rule. As to the exercise of the
power, here in the form of the creation of a trust, the period of the Rule
will run from the date the trust is established (the exercise of the pow-
er), not from the date of O's death (the creation of the power). All in-
terests will have either vested or failed by twenty-one years after A's
death, and thus, the Rule is satisfied
Example 9: S created an irrevocable trust that paid income to her
children for their lives, then at their deaths the assets to such appoin-
tees as the children may devise. These general testamentary powers of
appointment are invalid under the Rule because S could have another
child, born after the interest is created (the time when the trust was
created) who does not die until more than twenty-one years after S and
all of her children living at the time the trust was created have all died.
Example 10: S devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay
income to her children for their lives, then at their deaths the principal
to such appointees as they may devise. One of S's children, A, created
a testamentary trust with his power and devised his share of the trust
principal so that its income would go to his children for life, with the
remainder to his grandchildren. At S's death, A had one child, B. Here,
A's power of appointment is valid. A himself is the validating life. He
was alive at the creation of the power, and he must exercise the power
by his death. However, his exercise of the power violates the Rule. The
trust income to his children is a present interest and thus, valid, but the
189. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. F, The Validity of the Do-
nee's Exercise of a Valid Power, 8B U.L.A. 251-52 (2001).
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remainder interest to the grandchildren is void. The Rule started to run
at S's death. A's children and grandchildren cannot be validating lives
because they can be born after S's death. The grandchildren 's interest
will not indefeasibly vest until the death of A 's last surviving child.
Example 11: S devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay
income to A for life, and giving A a nongeneral power of appointment
over the remainder, exercisable in favor of A's descendants. At S's
death, A had two children, B and C. No further children were born to
A. A exercised her power of appointment in her will, directing that trust
income be paid to her children for their lives, and at their deaths, that
corpus be paid to A's grandchildren. The common law second-look
doctrine, in essence a wait-and-see doctrine, operates to make this ex-
ercise valid If A had had another child after S's death who survived A,
A's exercise would be invalid.
C. The Effect of the Rule
The common law Rule voids offending interests. Courts that follow the
common law Rule do not reform wills, trusts, or deeds so that the intent of
the grantor can be carried out as nearly as possible within the Rule's period.
They simply strike the interest that violates the Rule. 90
Example 12: S devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay
income to A for life, and then to pay the principal to those of A's child-
ren who reach the age of twenty-five. At S's death none of A's children
have reached the age of twenty-five. Their contingent remainders are
void. At A's death, the trust would become a resulting trust 9 ' and
would be distributed to S's estate.
Indeed, under the doctrine of "infectious invalidity," a few courts have
even voided interests that do not violate the Rule, if the invalid interest is so
essential to the general dispositive scheme of the testator or settlor that a
court will infer that she would not wish other interests to remain.
192
190. Leach, Reign of Terror, supra note 42, at 722.
191. A resulting trust is a trust implied by law when an express trust has failed. The trust
corpus is held for the benefit of the settlor or the settlor's estate. JOEL C. DoBRIS, STEWART
STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS: ESTATES AND TRUSTS 502-03 (2d ed.
2003).
192. See UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. H, Subsidiary Common-Law
Doctrines: Whether Superseded by This Act, 8B U.L.A. 256 (2001).
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Example 13: T devised one-half of Blackacre to his daughter A for
life, with a remainder to her children for their lives and then to her
grandchildren. The other half of Blackacre T devised to his son. The
contingent remainder to A's grandchildren is void because it could ei-
ther vest indefeasibly or fail more than twenty-one years after A's
death. Striking that remainder meant that one-fourth of Blackacre
would go to the daughter in fee simple and three-fourths to the son.
Applying the doctrine of infectious invalidity and reasoning that the
testator wanted daughter and son to take equal shares, the court
voided both devises, resulting in daughter A receiving one-half of
Blackacre in fee simple and the son receiving the other half '93
One "subsidiary doctrine" of the Rule mitigates its harsh effect; that is
the preference for validity. John Chipman Gray advocated that the Rule
should be "remorselessly" applied. 94 However, the Restatement of Property
proposed that when an instrument is ambiguous and could be construed ei-
ther to violate the Rule or to conform to it, the court should adopt the con-
struction that validates the future interest or power of appointment. 95
D. Arkansas Perpetuities Law
Article 2, section 19 of Arkansas's Constitution states as follows: "Per-
petuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a republic, and shall
not be allowed; nor shall any hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors
ever be granted or conferred in this State." The Arkansas Supreme Court has
interpreted this provision as applying the common law Rule. 196 Arkansas
cases involving the Rule are not plentiful; by this author's count, only ap-
proximately thirty-five published, appellate decisions exist in which the
Rule was an issue. 97
The Rule applies to contingent remainders. For example, two deeds
that in effect conveyed land to trustees for the benefit of "lineal descen-
dants," who would include future descendants not living at the time of the
transfer, were ruled invalid in Hendriksen v. Cubage.98 In that case, the
court held both deeds void. An executory interest was invalidated under the
Rule in McCrory School District of Woodruff County v. Brogden. 99 There,
193. Taylor v. Dooley, 297 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956).
194. GRAY, supra note 14, at § 629.
195. RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 375 (1944).
196. Collins v. Church of God of Prophecy, 304 Ark. 37, 39, 800 S.W.2d 418, 419
(1990).
197. See infra notes 198-251.
198. 225 Ark. 1049, 288 S.W.2d 608 (1956).
199. 231 Ark. 664, 333 S.W.2d 246 (1960).
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the grantor and his widow deeded land to the school district for school pur-
poses, to revert to the grantor's and widow's heirs if the property was used
otherwise.200 The court held that the "reversion" to the heirs was really an
executory interest and, therefore, was void under the Rule.2"' Since the wi-
dow was still alive, she held sole title in fee simple.
The most famous Arkansas perpetuities case is that of Dickerson v. Un-
ion National Bank of Little Rock. 2 In that case, a testator left a holographic
will creating a testamentary trust that left income to both of the testator's
sons and to other purposes. 20 3 At the death of both sons and "my son Mar-
tin's widow and until the youngest child of either son has reached the age of
twenty-five years," the trust would terminate. 2 ' 4 This trust violated the Rule
in two ways: first, because it was the fact situation of the Unborn Widow," 5
and second (although the court did not discuss this latter ground) because
the contingent remainder in the grandchildren might not vest indefeasibly
until more than twenty-one years after the death of lives in being. 0 6 At the
time of the Supreme Court's decision, the trust had already been in existence
for thirteen years. The trust was void; thus, the estate would be distributed to
the two sons under the laws of intestate succession.
With respect to nondonative future interests, Arkansas has considered
cases involving options to purchase, options to repurchase, and rights of first
refusal. The Supreme Court has held that an option to purchase, good for a
year, with no limit on the number of years that it can be renewed, and bind-
ing on both parties, their heirs, successors, and assigns, is subject to the Rule
and is invalid.2 7 One particularly harsh application of the Rule occurred in
Otter Creek Development Co. v. Friesenhahn.28 The option was "negotiated
at arms' length between knowledgeable and experienced real estate devel-
opers., 209 The option granted its holder a year in which to purchase six
200. Id. at 665-67, 333 S.W.2d at 247-49.
201. Id. at 671,333 S.W.2d at 251.
202. 268 Ark. 292, 595 S.W.2d 677 (1980). Dickerson has been included in several dece-
dents' estates casebooks. See, e.g., DOBRIS, STERK & LESLIE, supra note 191, at 843;
RAYMOND C. O'BRIEN & MICHAEL T. FLANNERY, DECEDENTS' ESTATES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 684 (2006).
203. Dickerson, 268 Ark. at 293, 595 S.W.2d at 678.
204. Id. at 294, 595 S.W.2d at 678.
205. See supra text accompanying note 180 for an explanation of this scenario.
206. Arguing on the winning side on appeal, along with Sanford L. Beshear, was the late
Robert Ross Wright III, the Donaghey Distinguished Professor of Law at this law school.
207. See generally Otter Creek Dev. Co. v. Friesenhahn, 295 Ark. 318, 750 S.W.2d 344
(1988) (option to purchase). But see Pults v. City of Springdale, 23 Ark. App. 182, 745
S.W.2d 144 (1988) (holding that the option to renew a lease "for successive terms of one
year" that did not limit the number of times the option could be exercised was only good for
one renewal).
208. 295 Ark. 318, 750 S.W.2d 344 (1988).
209. Id. at 323, 750 S.W.2d at 347 (Hays, J., dissenting).
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acres, and it could be renewed indefinitely, but it would be terminated if not
exercised within ninety days after the appellee received notice from the ap-
pellant that a building permit was available. 2'0 The appellee had paid a total
of $20,000 for the option over a period of five years, at which time the ap-
pellant made an about-face and argued that the Rule ought to void the op-
tion.2" ' The majority concluded that the grant of the permit might not occur
until beyond the period of the Rule.212 In the dissent's view, "these parties
assumed the conditions of the option would occur within a reasonable time"
and unsuccessfully argued for the application of estoppel.1 3
In dictum, the Arkansas Supreme Court has stated that an option to re-
purchase, when an owner has conveyed to a buyer but reserves a right to
initiate a purchase at a later date, may be subject to the Rule. In Broach v.
Hampton,2t 4 the City of Hampton acquired land from the Broaches for a
sewer system. 2 5 Three years later, the Broaches purchased some of the un-
used land back, but the city reserved a right of purchase, which the court
characterized as a right of repurchase.1 6 Seventeen years later, after the
death of the husband, the city sought to exercise its right. Ms. Broach re-
fused to sell.21 7 The court discussed a Kentucky case holding that an option
to repurchase violated the Rule,21 8 yet decided that the Rule did not apply to
the case at bar because the option was personal and would not extend
beyond the lives of the Broaches.
219
Some uncertainty may exist with respect to whether the Rule applies to
rights of first refusal or pre-emptive options. The Supreme Court has stated
in dictum that a right of first refusal does not fall under the Rule.220 In Estate
of Johnson, one couple had sold land to another by means of an installment
land contract.2 1 The sellers had contracted for a right of first refusal.222 The
contract stated that in the event the purchasers decided to sell, the sellers
would have an "option to purchase" at a price determined by appraisers.223
210. Id. at 319-20, 748 S.W.2d at 345.
211. Id. at 323, 748 S.W.2d at 347.
212. Id. at 321, 748 S.W.2d at 345.
213. Id. at 323-24, 748 S.W.2d at 347.
214. 283 Ark. 496, 677 S.W.2d 851 (1984).
215. Id. at 497, 677 S.W.2d at 853.
216. Id. at 498, 677 S.W.2d at 853.
217. Id.; 677 S.W.2d at 853.
218. Campbell v. Campbell, 230 S.W.2d 918 (Ky. 1950).
219. See generally Broach, 283 Ark. at 499, 677 S.W.2d at 854.
220. "We have not heretofore considered whether the rule against perpetuities should
apply to pre-emptive rights[,] but we think the generally held and better view is that such
rights should not violate the rule." Estate of Johnson v. Carr, 286 Ark. 369, 370, 691 S.W.2d
161, 161 (1985) (internal citations omitted).
221. Id., 691 S.W.2d at 161.
222. Id., 691 S.W.2d at 161.
223. Id., 691 S.W.2d at 161.
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Six years after the conveyance of the deed, the new owners decided to
sell.224 The original owners attempted to exercise the right of first refusal. 25
Rather than hold that the Rule applied, however, the court concluded that
the right of first refusal was personal and did not run with the land.226 Thus,
the right would terminate at the death of the couple.227 The court characte-
rized the interest that the plaintiffs held as both an option to repurchase and
a right of first refusal.228 However, since it was expressly contingent first
upon the owners deciding to sell, most authorities would regard it as a right
of first refusal, and not an option to repurchase.
Although options and so-called rights of first refusal are sometimes
confused, there is a clear and classic distinction: an option must be ac-
cepted and then performed within the time limit specified, or if none is
mentioned, then within a reasonable time, whereas a right of first refusal
has no binding effect unless the offeror decides to sell.2
The Arkansas Court of Appeals first considered the application of the
Rule to a right of first refusal in 1991 in Silvicraf, Inc. v. Southeast Timber
Co., Inc.23" The court held that the right of first refusal was personal to the
holder and would not extend beyond the holder's life.23" ' In 1998, however,
in Nash v. Scott, the court of appeals held that a "repurchase option contain-
ing the right of first refusal" that could be exercised by a party, or her heirs
and assigns, with no time limitation, was subject to the Rule and thus
invalid.232 The court of appeals did not cite Estate of Johnson (the right of
first refusal case) but rather Broach v. City of Hampton (the option to repur-
chase case). 233 From the information about the interest at issue in Nash, it is
not clear from the opinion whether the interest was an option to repurchase
or a right of first refusal.
One intriguing application of the Rule occurred when a couple entered
into an installment contract to buy a house, but the monthly payment under
the contract was actually less than the interest.234 Consequently the purchas-
ers and their successors in interest might have made payments for scores or
even hundreds of years without violating their contract or acquiring a right
224. Id., 691 S.W.2d at 161.
225. Id., 691 S.W.2d at 161.
226. Estate of Johnson, 286 Ark. at 371, 691 S.W.2d at 162.
227. Id., 691 S.W.2d at 162.
228. Id. at 370, 691 S.W.2d 161.
229. SAMUEL WILLISTON, 25 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 67:85 (Richard A.
Lord ed., 4th ed. 2002).
230. 34 Ark. App. 17, 805 S.W.2d 84 (1991).
231. Id. at 20, 805 S.W.2d at 86.
232. 62 Ark. App. 8, 10, 966 S.W.2d 936, 937 (1998).
233. Id. at 11, 966 S.W.2d at 937.
234. Comstock v. Smith, 255 Ark. 564, 564-65, 501 S.W.2d 617, 617 (1973).
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to a conveyance of the property. Thus, the alienability of the title might be
fettered for a period far beyond that allowed by the Rule.235 The Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's cancellation of the contract.
A trust provision stating that income was to be used to keep up the
grave of the testator and his wife was also held to violate the Rule. 236 If Ar-
kansas followed the cy pres doctrine with respect to the Rule, the court
could have reformed the provision to establish a cemetery for the purpose of
the perpetual care of those buried in it. However, the court was limited to
merely making this suggestion in dictum.237 Under the common law Rule, if
an entire trust is found to be void, a resulting trust in favor of the settlor re-
sults.238 This is one of the most striking differences from USRAP, which
will allow the trust to exist for as long as ninety years, at which point, if
interests have not either vested or failed, on petition, a court will reform the
trust to conform to the Rule yet carry out the settlor's wishes as closely as
possible.239
Indeed, many if not most Arkansas cases discussing the Rule hold that
the Rule does not apply, either because there was no future interest
created, 4' the future interest at issue is a reversionary interest,24' the re-
mainder is indefeasibly vested,242 the trust property was distributed and not
235. Id. at 566, 501 S.W.2d at 618.
236. See generally Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S.W.2d 370 (1929). Today
statutes allow perpetual trusts for the maintenance of cemeteries and burial plots. ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-17-904, 20-17-1013 (LEXIS Supp. 2005).
237. Union Trust Co., 108 Ark. at 557, 22 S.W.2d at 372.
238. See generally O'Neal v. Warmack, 250 Ark. 685,*466 S.W.2d 913 (1971).
239. Act of Mar. 9, 2007, No. 240, § 1, 2007 Ark. Acts 240 (to be codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 18-3-103).
240. See generally Cross v. Manning, 211 Ark. 803, 202 S.W.2d 584 (1947) (holding that
a will stating that the testator's "parental family and descendants inherit" twenty acres, to be
used for reunion purposes, and that the testator's nieces act as a committee in charge of the
property, devised the property in fee simple to the testator's relatives, and no trust was
created).
241. See generally Collins v. Church of God Prophecy, 304 Ark. 37, 800 S.W.2d 418
(1990) (concerning a possibility of reverter); Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W.2d
448 (1950) (holding that a conveyance that reserved a life estate in the grantor, then to a
Masonic Lodge as long as the property was used for certain purposes, and when it ceased to
be so used, to revert to the grantor's heirs, created a reversion to the grantor's estate rather
than an executory interest in the heirs).
242. See generally Cotham v. First Nat'l Bank, 287 Ark. 167, 697 S.W.2d 101 (1985)
(holding that a testamentary trust that directed the trust assets to named descendants did not
violate the Rule); Montgomery v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 357, 230 S.W.2d 51 (1950) (holding
that an inter vivos trust that directed the trust assets to named beneficiaries at the death of the
settlor did not violate the Rule); Farr v. Henson, 79 Ark. App. 114, 84 S.W.3d 871 (2002)
(holding that an inter vivos trust that directed the trust assets to the settlor's nephew at her
death did not violate the Rule).
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left in the trust perpetually, 243 the gift was charitable and not subject to the
Rule,244 or the contingent or executory interest would vest at or within twen-
ty-one years after the death of the life beneficiary.2 45 The Arkansas Supreme
Court has held that not only an oil and gas interest, but also a royalty interest
in oil and gas, are present interests and thus, not subject to the Rule, even if
no oil and gas are being produced at the time of the conveyance. 46 A cove-
nant running with the land does not violate the Rule.2 47 An agency contract
to sell property does not fall under the Rule because it does not grant an
interest in the property.248
In a case falling into the "slothful executor" category, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court has declined to carry the Rule to an absurd extreme. In Myers
v. Hardin,49 the testator appointed a trustee to distribute her estate as she
had directed, "as soon as possible., 25° Heirs of the testator argued that such
trust violated the Rule because there was no guarantee that the distribution
would take place within the period of the Rule. The court held that regard-
less of whether a trust was created, the will did not violate the Rule because
''as soon as possible" means "with due diligence and without unnecessary
243. See generally Sutter v. Sutter, 345 Ark. 12, 43 S.W.3d 736 (2001).
244. See generally Bakos v. Kryder, 260 Ark. 621, 543 S.W.2d 216 (1976); Garrett v.
Mendenhall, 209 Ark. 898, 192 S.W.2d 972 (1946) (holding that a devise to the trustees of a
church was a charitable devise, not subject to the Rule); Biscoe v. Thweatt, 74 Ark. 545, 86
S.W. 432 (1905); Grissom v. Hill, 17 Ark. 483 (1856).
245. See generally Dickson v. Renfro, 263 Ark. 718, 569 S.W.2d 66 (1978); Carroll v.
Robinson, 248 Ark. 904, 454 S.W.2d 329 (1970); Lytle v. Zebold, 227 Ark. 431, 299 S.W.2d
74 (1957); Fleming v. Blount, 202 Ark. 507, 151 S.W.2d 88 (1941) (upholding a devise that
forbade the division or sale until eleven years after the testator's death); Cribbs v. Walker, 74
Ark. 104, 85 S.W. 244 (1905) (holding that a deed conveying property in trust to a life bene-
ficiary and then to her children and her descendants would vest in her surviving descendants
at her death); Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 (1840) (holding that a will devising two slaves,
one each to A and B, but if either died without issue, then that slave to go to the survivor, was
valid under the Rule because the interest would either become possessory or fail at the deaths
ofA and B).
246. See generally Schnitt v. McKellar, 244 Ark. 377, 427 S.W.2d 202 (1968); Hanson v.
Ware, 224 Ark. 430, 274 S.W.2d 359 (1955); see also generally Bruce M. Kramer, Modern
Applications of the Rule Against Perpetuities to Oil and Gas Transactions: What the Duke of
Norfolk Didn't Tell You, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 281 (1997) (discussing how courts have
treated the Rule in the context of various types of oil and gas interests).
247. See generally Kell v. Bella Vista Vill. Prop. Owners Ass'n, 258 Ark. 757, 528
S.W.2d 651 (1975) (concerning a covenant to pay a property owners' association assess-
ment).
248. See generally Morning Star Mining Co. v. Bennett, 164 Ark. 244, 261 S.W. 639
(1924) (holding that a contract granting A the sole right to sell mining property, but not fixing
a time limit for the performance, was not void under the Rule because A would have to pro-
ceed within a reasonable time, and her authority would end with her death).
249. 208 Ark. 505, 186 S.W.2d 925 (1945).
250. Id. at 511, 186 S.W.2d at 928.
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delay in the circumstances, and certainly within the lifetime of the trus-
tee."25'
No Arkansas case has considered the Rule with respect to powers of
appointment. Arkansas has not considered the Rule as applied to the validity
of powers themselves, the validity of the exercise of powers, or the second-
look doctrine. Nor has any Arkansas case discussed infectious invalidity,
separability, specific sum or subclass doctrines, which are all exceptions to
the all-or-nothing rule.252 Although Arkansas has recognized and applied the
common law Rule, it has not considered the Rule in its full depth or breadth.
IV. UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities was adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1986. It
was unanimously endorsed by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association, the Board of Regents of the American College of Probate
Counsel, and the Board of Governors of the American College of Real Es-
tate Lawyers. 253 The drafters of the USRAP sought to preserve the policy
underlying the common law Rule, yet avoid its most egregious extremes.
The USRAP keeps the common law Rule and reforms it in two ways: by
adding a ninety-year wait-and-see element and a "deferred-reformation ele-
ment." Thus, if an interest is invalid under the common law Rule, it is re-
examined ninety years after its creation. At that time, if it is still invalid, a
court must reform the instrument. The USRAP is short--only six sections
long.254 It does not require lawyers to modify their current practices or to
learn anything new in the way of perpetuities analysis.255 In 1990, USRAP
was incorporated into sections 2-901 through 2-906 of the Uniform Probate
Code. As a result, there are two different sets of official comments to
251. Id., 186 S.W.2d at 928.
252. See supra text accompanying note 165, 195. The separability doctrine states that
when an interest is subject to alternative contingencies, the holder of the interest is treated as
though there were two interests. Even if the interest is invalid under one contingency, if it is
valid under the other, it is regarded as valid. The specific sum doctrine states that if a specific
sum is to be paid to each member of a class, each member's interest will be treated separate-
ly-in other words, the usual "all or nothing" rule for a class will not apply. Finally, the
subclass doctrine states that if a class can be divided into subclasses, (e.g., "the children of
each of my children," rather than "my grandchildren"), each subclass can be considered sepa-
rately to determine whether its interests are valid under the Rule. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES § 1, cmt. H, Subsidiary Common-Law Doctrines: Whether Superseded by This
Act, 8B UL.A. 255-58 (2001).
253. Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 569, 569 (1986).
254. The full text of USRAP as enacted in Arkansas is reproduced in Appendix A, infra.
Arkansas made no changes to the uniform act's text.
255. Waggoner, supra note 253, at 592.
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USRAP-the comments published with the stand-alone act in 1986 and
those that accompany the act as a part of the Uniform Probate Code.256
Arkansas Code section 18-3-101(a)(1) restates the common law Rule
and invalidates a "nonvested property interest"257 unless it will be certain to
vest or terminate no later than twenty-one years after the death of an indi-
vidual alive at its creation (the common law Rule). But, section 18-3-
101(a)(2) saves the interest if it will vest or terminate within ninety years
after its creation.
Example 14: T devised Blackacre "to A for life, then to A's children
who reach the age of twenty-five." At Ts death, A has two children,
ages five and ten. A 's children have contingent remainders. They must
reach the age of twenty-five in order for their interests to vest indefeas-
ibly. In addition, A may have more children, thus adding more mem-
bers to the class. Consequently, at A's death, the class of children will
not be indefeasibly vested The latest this could occur, if A had a child
the day of his death, would be twenty-five years after A's death. Most
likely, A will not live to exceed 100 years old and adopt a child the day
before his death. Therefore, the remainder to A's children will almost
certainly be valid under section 18-3-101(a)(2) because it will either
vest or terminate within ninety years of T's death.
In the previous example, even if great advances in anti-aging medicine
occur and it becomes likely that A not only will live to be 150 but will also
have a child at such an advanced age, nonetheless, a petitioner challenging
the will on the grounds that it violates USRAP will have to wait ninety years
to bring a lawsuit. Some commentators believe that such suits will be
"grand" lawsuits "from which the attorneys involved will profit more than
256. Both sets of comments are available on the Internet. The original comments, which
are far more extensive and helpful, are available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/usrap90.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2007).
They are also printed with the text of USRAP in volume 8B of Uniform Laws Annotated. The
more brief Uniform Probate Code comments are available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/upc/final2005.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2007).
257. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 18-3-101(a)(1) (2003). Vested and nonvested property interests
under USRAP are identical to those under the common law Rule. Vested property interests
are reversionary interests, indefeasibly vested remainders, and vested remainders subject to
divestment. Nonvested property interests are contingent remainders, vested remainders sub-
ject to open, and executory interests.
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,,218any of the parties. The opposing argument is "who will challenge a gift
at the end of ninety years?
259
As gifts with age contingencies in excess of twenty-one years are no
longer automatically invalidated by the Rule,. donors may well begin to in-
crease the age limits of such contingencies. After all, when we think of our
own children, how many of us would not prefer them to reach the age of
thirty, rather than of eighteen or twenty-one, before gaining control over
property, especially if large amounts of property are at issue?
USRAP will also allow more gifts to generations further removed from
donors, as seen in the following example.
Example 15: T devised Blackacre to his wife W for life, then to T's
children for their lives, then to T's grandchildren for their lives, then
the remainder to T's great-grandchildren . At T's death, he is survived
by W, age 80, two children A and B, ages fifty-five and fifty, three
grandchildren C, D, and E, ages thirty-five, thirty, and twenty, and two
great-grandchildren F and G, ages ten and five. Under the common law
Rule, the great-grandchild's vested remainder subject to open would
be void. It cannot vest indefeasibly until the deaths of all of T's grand-
children, and more grandchildren could be born after T's death, so the
class of grandchildren will not work as validating lives. The last
grandchild could die more than twenty-one years after the death of the
last survivor of T's children, so the children cannot be validating lives
for the great-grandchildren either. Under the USRAP, however, the in-
terest of the class of great-grandchildren cannot be declared invalid
for ninety years after T's death, by which time they may well have
vested indefeasibly. It is unlikely that A and B will have more children
and that C will live to exceed the age of 110. Even if the great-
grandchildren's interest remains nonvested at that time, on petition a
court can close the class and reform the instrument to say "the re-
mainder to T's great-grandchildren born within ninety years of T's
death. "
Section 18-3-101(a) validates almost all cases of the fertile octogenarian,
unborn widow, precocious toddler, magic gravel pit, and slothful execu-
tor.
260
258. Ronald C. Link & Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts,
74 N.C. L. REV. 1783, 1790 (1996).
259. Id; see also generally Jesse Dukeminier, supra note 23, offering a scathing criticism
of the ninety-year wait-and-see period.
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Section 18-3-101 (b) deals with general powers of appointment not pre-
sently exercisable because of a condition precedent.26' Such a power of ap-
pointment is invalid in the same types of circumstances, either because the
condition precedent will be satisfied or not within twenty-one years of the
death of an individual alive at the time of its creation, or because the condi-
tion precedent will be satisfied or not by the time ninety years have passed.
Example 16: T devised Blackacre "to my son A for life, then to A's
youngest daughter for life, then to such persons, including her or her
estate, as she shall appoint after reaching the age of thirty." At T's
death, A has one son. Here, A 's youngest daughter, who is unborn
when the power is created, has a general, nontestamentary power of
appointment subject to the condition precedent of living to age thirty.
The power fails the test of section 18-3-101(b)(1) because A could
have a daughter the day before he died, who would not reach the age
of 30 within the Rule's period-twenty-one years after A's death.
However, under 1(b)(2), the validity of the power is in abeyance for
ninety years, during which time the daughter will either be born and
reach the age of thirty, or not.
Section l(c) deals with nongeneral powers and general, testamentary
powers. They are invalid unless they are certain to either be exercised or to
terminate within the common law Rule period, or unless they are exercised
or terminate within ninety years of their creation.
Example 17: S created an irrevocable trust that pays income to her
children for their lives, then at their deaths the assets to such appoin-
tees as they may devise. These general powers of appointment are
invalid under section 18-3-101(c)(1) because S could have another
child, born after the interest is created (the time when the trust was
created) who does not die until more than twenty-one years after S and
her children living at the time the trust was created have all died.
However, under section 18-3-101(c)(2), their validity is held in ab-
eyance until ninety years after the creation of the trust. If the deaths of
all the children have occurred by then, then the gift is valid because ei-
ther the powers will have been exercised or will have terminated
260. See UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUIrIES § 1 cmt. C, section 1 (a)(2), Wait-and-
See-Nonvested Property Interests Whose Validity Is Initially in Abeyance, 8B U.L.A. 244-46
(2001) (discussing how these hypotheticals are made valid by USRAP).
261. Presently exercisable general powers of appointment that are not subject to a condi-
tion precedent are not subject to USRAP. They are the virtual equivalent of a fee simple. See
UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. D, sections 1 (b)(1) and 1 (c)(1): Powers of
Appointment that Are Initially Valid, 8B U.L.A. 246-48 (2001).
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Section 18-3-101(c) also applies to fiduciary powers of appointment,
those exercised by the trustee, as in the following example:262
Example 18: S devised property in trust, directing the trustee to accu-
mulate the income or to pay all or a part of it to S's only child A during
her lifetime, then after A's death, to accumulate the income or to pay
all or a part of it in equal or unequal shares among A's children until
the death of the last survivor, and then to pay the principal and remain-
ing income to A's grandchildren and their heirs per stirpes. Under the
common law Rule set out in section 18-3-101(c)(1), the trustee's power
would become invalid twenty-one years after the death of the last to
survive of A and any of her descendants alive at S's death. However,
under section 18-3-101(c)(2), we must wait until ninety years have
passed from S's death before declaring the trustee's power invalid.
Then, according to the Official Comment, they become invalid only if
exercised beyond the end of ninety years. There is no retroactive inva-
lidity. In addition, if the powers do become invalid at the end of the ni-
nety years, a court must reform the instrument.
263
Another aspect of powers of appointment under USRAP is the validity
of the exercise of a power of appointment. As the Official Comment points
out, just because a power of appointment itself is valid does not mean that
its exercise in a particular case is valid.26 If the power is a presently exercis-
able power, the time of creation of any interests or powers created by the
power is when the power is exercised.2 65 USRAP follows the common law
Rule here, as seen in the following example.
Example 19: S devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay
income to A for life. A also had a presently exercisable power of ap-
pointment over the remainder interest. A, by deed, directed the trustee
after A's death to pay income to A's children for their lives, and at the
death of A's last surviving child, to pay the principal to A's grandchil-
dren. As the comment points out, the validity of A's power of appoint-
ment is clear. A 's presently exercisable, general power of appointment
is not even subject to USRAP. However, what about A's exercise of the
262. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. E, Sections l(b)(2) and 1(c)(2):
Wait-And-See-Powers of Appointment Whose Validity Is Initially in Abeyance, 8B U.L.A. at
249 (2001).
263. Id.
264. See UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. F, The Validity of the Donee's
Exercise ofa Valid Power, 8B U.L.A. 249 (2001).
265. See UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 2 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 268 (2001).
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power? In the case of the creation offuture interests or powers of ap-
pointment by one holding a presently exercisable power of appoint-
ment, the period of the Rule runs from the exercise of the power. Here,
that is when the deed was delivered to the trustee. Since the deed was
irrevocable, the future interests created by it must vest or fail within
twenty-one years after the death of the last of A and his issue alive
when the deed was delivered A was alive, thus A could have more
children afterward. And, the vesting date (the death of A 's last child)
could occur out past the common law Rule's time limit. However, un-
der section 18-3-101(a)(2), the validity of A's exercise of the power
will be indeterminable for ninety years, and at the end of the time, a
court may reform the disposition.266
If, however, the power of appointment creating a future interest or
power of appointment is a general, testamentary or nongeneral power of
appointment, to determine the validity of the interest or power that has been
created by its exercise, under USRAP, just as under the common law Rule,
the time period starts to run when the initial power of appointment was
created.267 However, USRAP gives us an additional ninety years in which to
see whether the interest will vest or fail, or the power will have to be exer-
cised or will terminate.268
Example 20: S devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay
income to her children for their lives, then at their deaths the principal
to such appointees as the children may devise. One of S's children, A,
creates a testamentary trust with his power and devises his share of the
trust principal so that its income goes to his children for life, with the
remainder to his grandchildren. At S's death, A had one child, B. Here,
A's power of appointment is valid. A himself is the validating life. He
was alive at the creation of the power, and he must exercise the power
by his death. His exercise of the power violates the common law Rule,
however, because the remainder interest in the trust created by A "re-
lates back" to the date of the creation of A 's power of appointment,
under section 18-3-102. However, the wait-and-see provision in sec-
tion 18-3-101 (a) (2) holds off on the determination of validity for ninety
years after S's death to see whether all of A's children have died by
then, and the class of grandchildren has become indefeasibly vested.269
266. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. F, The Validity of the Donee's
Exercise of a Valid Power, 8B U.L.A. 249-52 (2001).
267. Id. at 249.
268. Seeid. at250,251.
269. Id. at 250.
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There are three certainties in the world of the Rule: everyone dies; eve-
ryone can have children while alive; and no one can have children after
one's death (other than the normal period of gestation, which the Rule in-
cludes). Section l(d)'s purpose is to preserve the third certainty. Section
1 (d) curbs the effect that modem medical science has on the Rule by declar-
ing that the possibility that a child can be born to an individual more than
the normal gestation period after the individual's death is to be disregarded.
Section 18-3-101 (d) can be illustrated by the following example.
Example 21: T devised Blackacre to A for life, then to A's children. In
the world of the common law Rule, no children can be born to A more
than the normal gestation time after A's death. But, what about today's
world, where the possibilities of frozen sperm and frozen embryos
make it entirely possible that A 's child could be born thirty years after
A's death? This could destroy one of the essential components of the
Rule. Section 18-3-101(d) allows the law to disregard the possibility of
afterborn children when applying the Rule. Under section 18-3-101(d),
A can continue to be a validating life for his children's interests.
Note that USRAP does not address the legal status of children con-
ceived after death. Nor does USRAP affect the common law Rule that a
child in gestation, or en ventre sa mere, who is born alive, is regarded as
legally alive at the commencement of gestation.270
Section 18-3-101(e) applies to certain types of savings clauses. Savings
clauses are used to avoid the inadvertent violation of the Rule. Though they
are standard inclusions in wills and trusts, the drafting of them is not without
risk.271 Section 18-3-101(e) was added in 1990, four years after the adoption
of USRAP, to solve problems that certain types of savings clauses would
create if used in USRAP jurisdictions with certain types of trusts. Simply
put, the IRS was not happy with the possibility that savings clauses could
use alternate time periods, either the common law period or the ninety-year
period of USRAP. The solution was section 18-3-101(e), which limits a
two-pronged savings clause that seeks to use either the common law Rule
period or the ninety-year period to the common law Rule period.272 The draf-
270. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §1 cmt. B, Section 1(a)(1): Nonvested
Property Interests that Are Initially Valid, 8B U.L.A. 240-41 (2001).
271. See infra text accompanying notes 316-17 for more discussion of savings clauses.
272. Briefly, when USRAP was adopted, even though it was not retroactive in general, it
allowed grandfathered trusts to take advantage of USRAP if the trusts authorized holders of
nongeneral powers of appointment to exercise the powers after the effective date of USRAP.
Dukeminier referred to this as the "tax trap" of USRAP. For a more detailed explanation, see
UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt.G, Section l(e): Effect of Certain "Later-
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ters of USRAP intended that attorneys would continue to use their already-
existing savings clauses. For those attorneys who modify them, seeking to
maximize the benefit of the ninety-year period under USRAP, section 1 (e) is
intended to save their clients from unintended tax consequences.
Example 22: S devised property in trust. The savings clause stated that
"notwithstanding any other provision in this instrument, this trust shall
terminate, if it has not previously terminated, twenty-one years after
the death of my last surviving child, or ninety years after my death,
whichever is later." This savings clause is subject to section 18-3-
101(e) and thus, the ninety-year clause will be inoperative. S could use
either provision by itself, but not the later of the two.
Section 18-3-102 states that the time of creation of a nonvested proper-
ty interest or a power of appointment is determined under general principles
of property law. These are not stated in section 18-3-102, but some of them
are in the official comment. Interests and powers created by a will, testa-
mentary trust, or revocable trust become effective at the death of the testator
and not at the execution of the will or trust. Interests and powers created by
a deed or inter vivos, irrevocable trust are created when the transfer becomes
effective, either at the delivery of the deed or the funding of the trust. Inter-
ests and powers created by a presently exercisable, general power of ap-
pointment are deemed created at the exercise of the power. However, inter-
ests and powers created by a general, testamentary power or a nongeneral
power are deemed created when the general, testamentary power or nonge-
neral power was created, not when it was exercised. 73
Section 2(b) provides that if one person can exercise a power to be-
come the unqualified beneficial owner of a nonvested property interest or
interest subject to a power of appointment (e.g., a settlor of a revocable inter
vivos trust), then the time of creation of the interest or power is postponed
until the power to become the unqualified, beneficial owner ceases to exist
(e.g., when the trust becomes irrevocable), as demonstrated by the following
example.
Example 23: T created a revocable, inter vivos trust, directing the trus-
tee (T) to pay income to himself, T, for life, then to 7's son A for life,
then to A's children until the death of the last surviving child who was
living at 7's death, then the corpus to be distributed to A's then-living
of' Type Language: Coordination of Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Regulations with
Unifonn Act, 8B U.L.A. 252 (2001). For a highly critical take on section 1(e), with drafting
advice for lawyers in USRAP states, see Dukeminier, supra note 74, at 187-202.
273. See supra text accompanying note 189.
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descendants per stirpes. A's children's vested remainder subject to
open and the contingent remainder in A 's descendants are not created
until T's death, when the trust becomes irrevocable.
Other examples involving such situations as powers in unborn children, par-
tial powers, and incapacity in the donee of the power are set out in the
comment.274
Section 2(c) sets the creation of a nonvested interest or power of ap-
pointment that arises from a transfer of property to a previously funded trust
or other existing property arrangement at the point when the original contri-
bution was made. The following example illustrates its operation.
Example 24: In 1995, S created an irrevocable, inter vivos trust with
life income to S, remainder to his daughter, A, for life, then to A's
children, funding it with $1 million. In 2000, when the value of the
corpus had risen to $1.5 million, S added $500,000 to the trust. S died
in 2005. S's pour-over will distributed the residue of his estate (worth
$500,000) into the trust. Section 18-3-102(c) makes 1995 the date that
A's and A's children's interests were created with respect to the entire
$2.5 million.
Section 18-3-103 is the reformation, or "cypres," provision of USRAP.
This section provides that if an interested person petitions a court, it "shall"
reform a disposition so that it vests within ninety years and as nearly as
possible carries out the intent of the donor. A court has the power of refor-
mation in three situations. First, a court will reform a disposition if a proper-
ty interest or power of appointment subject to USRAP becomes invalid.
Example 25: S devised property in trust and directed the trustee to pay
the income "to A for life, then to A's children until the death of the last
surviving child, then to A's grandchildren until the death of the last
surviving grandchild, and on the death of that grandchild, the corpus of
the trust is to be divided among A's surviving descendants per stirpes,
otherwise to the Humane Society." At S's death, she was survived by
one child, A, and by A's child, B. After S's death, A had another child,
C. At A's death, A was survived by B, C, and two grandchildren, D and
E. Four interests are subject to USRAP: the vested remainder subject
to open in A 's children, the contingent remainder in A 's grandchil-
dren, the alternate, contingent remainder in A's surviving descendants,
and the alternate, contingent remainder in the Humane Society. A 's
children's nonvested interest is valid under section I (a)(]) of USRAP,
274. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 2 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 267-71 (2001).
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as it would be under the common law Rule. If A and all of A 's children
have died by the ninetieth anniversary of S's death, then A's grand-
children's nonvested interest will be valid under section 1(a)(2), the
ninety-year wait-and-see period If however, some of A's grandchil-
dren are still alive at the ninetieth anniversary of S's death, then the
two alternate, contingent remainders are invalid under USRAP. The
Official Comment suggests that a court would reform the disposition
by closing the class of A's descendants as of the ninetieth anniversary
of S's death, changing the disposition to "then to S's grandchildren for
life, and at the death of S's last surviving grandchild, to the descen-
dants of S alive at the ninetieth anniversary of S's death, per stirpes. "
There is no need for the alternate, contingent remainder to the Hu-
mane Society because we already know that S has living descendants
at the ninetieth anniversary of her death. Their interests vested inde-
feasibly at that time. Even if no one survives the deaths of the grand-
children, their estates will receive the corpus, per stirpes.275
Second, a court will reform a disposition if a class gift is not yet invalid
but might become so, and the time has come when the share of one member
of the class is to take effect in possession or enjoyment. This situation will
probably arise most often in an age-contingency situation.
Example 26: S devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay
income "to A for life, then to A's children, the corpus of the trust to be
equally divided among A's children who reach the age of thirty-five."
S was survived by A, age twenty-five, and by A's child B, who was five
years old when S died. Here, A's child B and any yet-to-be-born child-
ren of A have contingent remainders. The official comment reminds us
that at common law, and so also under USRAP, the interests of every
class member must be valid or the class gift is totally invalid. Suppose
that sixty years after S's death, A was still alive and feeling spry
enough to adopt the newborn C. The child, C, would not reach the age
of thirty-five until ninety-five years after S's death. A died 5 years lat-
er, sixty-five years after S's death. B is now seventy. C is only 5. C may
die before reaching the age of 35, or may still be alive but not yet thir-
ty-five, on the ninetieth anniversary of S's death, in which case under
section 18-3-101(a) the class gift is invalid. Under section 3, a court
may reform S's disposition so that it reads "to A's children who reach
the age of thirty. " This reformation validates the class gift. B may take
275. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 3 cmt, example (1), 8B U.L.A. 275
(2001).
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one-half of the corpus. If C reaches the age of thirty, C will take the
other half, if not, B will get it.276
Note that in the preceding example, the court would not wait out the ninety-
year period to reform the trust.
Third, a court will reform a disposition if a property interest that is
invalid under section 18-3-101(a)(1) can vest but not within the ninety-year
period. In this situation, a court is also required to reform the disposition
before the end of the ninety-year period.
Example 27: In a holographic will, S devised property in trust, direct-
ing the trustee to divide the income, per stirpes, among S's descen-
dants, on an annual basis, for 100 years. At the end of that time, the
trustee is to distribute the corpus to S's then-living descendants per
stirpes, otherwise to the Nature Conservancy. Here, S's descendants
have an alternate, contingent remainder that cannot vest for 100 years
after S's death. (Note that it could fail earlier than 100 years, if S's
descendants died out.) This remainder is invalid under USRAP. Sec-
tion 18-3-103 allows the court to reform the instrument. The comment
suggests changing the 100-year period after S's death to ninety
years.
277
Section 18-3-104 excludes certain interests from its coverage, includ-
ing the following:
Nonvested property interests or powers of appointment arising out
of a nondonative transfer. For decades scholars criticized the majority rule
that the Rule applied to options to purchase, options to repurchase, and
rights of first refusal in commercial contexts. These are not subject to
USRAP. However, if they arise in a familial context, in the context of di-
vorce, spousal election, or a contract to make a will, then that brings them
under USRAP. Also, the comment points out that the presence of considera-
tion does not necessarily make a transfer nondonative. 78
Fiduciaries' powers relating to the administration or management
of assets. The official comment distinguishes between purely administrative
powers, such as the power to sell and reinvest trust assets, which are ex-
cluded from USRAP coverage, and distributive fiduciary powers, such as
276. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 3 cmt., example (3), 8B U.L.A. 276
(2001).
277. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 3 cmt., example (5), 8B U.L.A. 277-78
(2001).
278. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 4 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 280-81 (2001).
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the power to invade the corpus, which is a nongeneral power of appointment
and is covered by USRAP.
279
Power to appoint a fiduciary. Such a power is not subject to
USRAP.
280
Trustee's Discretionary Power to Distribute Principal to an Inde-
feasibly Vested Beneficiary Before Trust Termination. This is an excep-
tion to the general rule that discretionary power of the trustee to distribute
trust property falls under USRAP.
281
Charitable or Governmental Interests Preceded by Charitable or
Governmental Interests. This exception preserves the common law Rule's
exclusion of charitable interests.
However, note that a charitable interest in conjunction with a noncha-
ritable interest is still subject to the Rule.282
Example 28: S devised property in trust "to A for life, then to A's
children for life, then to the UALR Bowen School of Law." At S's
death, A is alive. The School of Law's interest is subject to USRAP.
Since it is not valid under the common law Rule, it will be subject to
the ninety-year wait-and-see period
Example 29: S devised property in trust "to the Red Cross, but when
the Cubs win the World Series, then to the UALR Bowen School of
Law." Here the executory interest of the law school follows a charita-
ble interest. It is not subject to USRAP.
Trusts for Employees and Self-Employed Individuals. These are ex-
cluded from USRAP, but the exclusion does not extend to "a nonvested
property interest or a power of appointment created by an election of a par-
ticipant or beneficiary or spouse. 283
All of Those Reversionary Interests You Had to Memorize in Law
School. Just as under the common law Rule, reversions, rights of entry, and
possibilities of reverter are excluded from coverage of USRAP.284
Section 5 makes USRAP prospective, but with two important excep-
tions. First, if an already-existing trust gives a power of appointment to a
donee, and the donee exercises it by creating a nonvested interest or power
of appointment after the effective date of USRAP, the new interest or power
is covered by USRAP.
279. Id. at 281-82.
280. Id. at 282.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 282-83.
283. Id. at 283.
284. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 4 cmt. 8B U.L.A. 283 (2001).
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Example 30: S devised property in trust, "to A for life, then the corpus
as A may appoint by will, otherwise to Greenpeace." S died in 1990.
S's state enacted USRAP in 2000. In 2005, A died, exercising the pow-
er of appointment to devise the corpus in trust, paying "income to B for
life, then at B's death, the corpus to be distributed to B's children." The
exercise of A's power is covered by USRAP. USRAP will apply as to
whether A 's power is valid and whether the exercise of A's power is
valid.
285
Second, if in a judicial proceeding commenced after the effective date
of USRAP, an interest or power created before the effective date of USRAP
is determined to violate prior state perpetuities law (in Arkansas, the com-
mon law Rule), then if an interested person petitions a court, it "may"
reform the disposition to make it conform with the common law Rule.286
Although sections 18-3-106 and -107 are not important to this discus-
sion, section 18-3-109 notes that USRAP supersedes the common law.287
USRAP restates the common law Rule, provides a "safety net" in the form
of wait-and-see and mandatory cy pres, and exempts interests that are not
connected with donative transfers. It preserves the advantages of the Rule
while attempting to cure its deficiencies.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE USRAP ON CURRENT ARKANSAS LAW
The Constitutionality of USRAP. Possibly the first issue to be de-
cided with respect to what effect USRAP will have on Arkansas law is
whether it is constitutional. Article 2, section 19 of the Arkansas Constitu-
tion states that "[p]erpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a
republic and shall not be allowed; nor shall any hereditary emoluments, pri-
vileges[,] and honors ever be granted or conferred in this [s]tate." The Su-
preme Court has stated that the Constitution prohibits perpetuities "but does
not describe them., 288 The Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted this con-
stitutional provision to mean that the common law Rule applies in Arkan-
sas.289 Can the legislature validly enact a statutory version of the Rule? Al-
285. Id. at 286-87.
286. Id. at 287-89.
287. For a discussion of USRAP's effect on subsidiary doctrines, see UNIF. STAT. RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. H, Subsidiary Common-Law Doctrines: Whether Superseded
by this Act, 8B U.L.A. 255-56 (2001); see also supra text accompanying note 252.
288. Otter Creek Dev. Co. v. Friesenhahn, 295 Ark. 318, 320, 750 S.W.2d 344, 345
(1988).
289. Id., 750 S.W.2d at 345.
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most certainly, yes. Arkansas statutes are presumed to be constitutional.290
Before an act will be held unconstitutional, the incompatibility between it
and the constitution must be clear.29' The "heavy burden" as to the constitu-
tionality of a statute is on the party attacking it.292 In fact, if it is possible to
construe a statute as constitutional, the Supreme Court must do so.293 If the
constitutionality of the statute were challenged, the Supreme Court has
stated that it will consider whether there is "any rational basis" that demon-
strates the "possibility of a deliberate nexus" with state goals proving that
the legislation is not a product of "arbitrary and capricious government pur-
poses., 294 If the Supreme Court determines that such a rational basis exists,
then USRAP would withstand a constitutional challenge.295 Arkansas cer-
tainly has a rational basis in enacting a statute that will cure deficiencies of
the common law Rule and allow courts to better carry out the intent of do-
nors.
The same constitutional provision that forbids perpetuities also forbids
monopolies. However, the legislature enacts statutes regulating monopolies..
For example, one of the Arkansas Unfair Trade Practices Act's purposes is
to "safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopo-
lies., 296 This purpose has been cited with approval; the legislature's right to
regulate monopolies has been upheld and held constitutional by the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court. 7 In fact, the legislature is allowed to create and regu-
late monopolies to a limited extent, most notably in the arena of public utili-
ties.298 There would seem to be no logical reason to allow statutory regula-
tion of monopolies but not of perpetuities.
If we examine the experience of sister states, eight states other than
Arkansas-Arizona, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennes-
see, Texas, and Wyoming-have constitutional provisions prohibiting per-
petuities. 299 All but those of Arizona, Montana, and Nevada are virtually
identical to that of Arkansas.3" Every one of these states except for Okla-
homa and Texas (which both have modified the common law Rule with cy
290. Whorton v. Dixon, 363 Ark. 330, 336, 214 S.W.3d 225, 230 (2005).
291. Id., 214 S.W.3d at 230.
292. Id., 214 S.W.3d at 230.
293. See generally Bowker v. State, 363 Ark. 345, 214 S.W.3d 243 (2005).
294. Davis v. Parham, 362 Ark. 352, 363, 208 S.W.3d 162, 169 (2005).
295. Id., 208 S.W.3d at 169.
296. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-202 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
297. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Am. Drugs, Inc., 319 Ark. 214, 231-33, 891 S.W.2d 30,
40-41 (1995).
298. Ark. Elec. Co-op Corp. v. Ark. Public Serv. Comm'n, 42 Ark. App. 198, 207, 856
S.W.2d 880, 884 (1993).
299. ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 29; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. XV, § 4;
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 22; WYo. CONST. art. I, § 30.
300. See discussion infra app. B (presenting the texts of these statutes).
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pres provisions) and Wyoming (which has the common law Rule with the
exception of 1000-year trusts) has enacted the Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities.3"' In none of these states has the constitutionality of
USRAP been raised. In all of them, USRAP is on the books and function-
ing.
302
Another question concerns "nondonative, nonvested interests" ex-
cluded from the Rule-such as options to purchase and options to repur-
chase-some of which Arkansas has clearly ruled are subject to the common
law Rule.3 °3 Will these interests continue to be measured against the com-
mon law Rule? Can it be successfully argued that the common law Rule still
exists as to them? The correct decision is no. USRAP expressly excludes
these interests from its coverage, and USRAP supersedes the common law
Rule. Thus, with the enactment of USRAP, no part of the common law Rule
will exist, and options to purchase, options to repurchase, and rights of first
refusal will no longer fall prey to the common law Rule, nor will they be
affected by USRAP, unless they are part of a donative transfer. The official
comment to section 4 states as follows: "Since the Common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities is superseded by this Act... , a nonvested property
interest, power of appointment, or other arrangement excluded from the
Statutory Rule by this section is not subject to any rule against perpetuities,
statutory or otherwise. ' '3°4 This is the result reached by other states that have
considered the issue post-USRAP adoption.0 5 It can be argued that, since
Arkansas's constitution prohibits perpetuities, any interest not covered by
USRAP is still covered by the constitutional provision. This question has
not been decided by the courts in USRAP states whose constitutional provi-
sions forbid perpetuities. However, in addition to the clear intent behind
USRAP, statutory rules of construction also argue for such a result. General
legislation in which exceptions are "minutely described," as they are here,3" 6
indicates a legislative intent that the statute should replace the whole of the
common law.307
What law would then apply to the duration of options, rights of first re-
fusal, and the like? If they are personal, they terminate at the death of the
holder. If they are not personal but can be assigned, the modern trend is that
301. See discussion infra app. B (containing information on each state).
302. USRAP was originally enacted in Arizona but heavily amended later to allow perpe-
tual trusts. See discussion infra app. B (detailing Arizona's actions).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 220-32.
304. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 4 cmt., 8B U.L.A. 280 (2001).
305. See discussion infra app. B (listing cases cited under the California and Kansas
provisions).
306. Act of Mar. 9, 2007, 2007 Ark. Acts 240 (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-3-
104).
307. NORMAN J. SINGER, 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 50:05 (6th ed. 2000).
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rights of first refusal are subject to the rule of unreasonable restraints on
alienation." 8 Options to purchase, like terms in a contract for sale, would be
construed to be performed within a reasonable time, based on the intent of
the parties.3" 9
Another question involves the petition by "interested parties" to reform
a disposition under USRAP. "Interested persons" is not defined in USRAP
but is instead in the Uniform Probate Code, section 1-201(23), which is not
law in Arkansas. The UPC definition includes "heirs, devisees, children,
spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or
claim against [the] estate," as well as "persons having priority for appoint-
ment as personal representative, and other fiduciaries representing interested
persons."3 '° Arkansas's probate statutes contain a definition of "interested
persons." It is narrower than that of the UPC, including only heirs, devisees,
spouses, creditors, or others having a property right, interest in, or claim
against the estate being administered, and fiduciaries.3"
USRAP's greatest benefit is that it relieves the harshness of the Rule in
two ways: by providing a mandatory, ninety-year wait-and-see period, and
at the end of the period, or before if necessary, by requiring courts to reform
provisions that violate the Rule. USRAP will bring a kinder, gentler Rule to
Arkansas. It offers more certainty to the drafter, providing her with a "safety
net," and it will help to effectuate, rather than hinder, the intent of testators
and settlors. It should also reduce litigation over possible Rule violations. As
Appendix B indicates, in those states that have enacted USRAP, considering
all of them together, there have been only a handful of perpetuities cases in
the succeeding years.
One of the criticisms of the wait-and-see aspect of USRAP is that it
"puts property interests in abeyance-no one [can] determine whether an
interest [is] valid or not." '312 As Waggoner points out, however, USRAP
merely adds an additional contingency to already-contingent interests, but
then specifies a time limit within which they must vest.313 "[O]nly the status
of the affected future interest in the trust or other property arrangement is
deferred. In the interim, the other interests, such as the interests of current
income beneficiaries, are carried out in the normal course without obstruc-
tion.,,314
308. Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1867, 1908
(1986).
309. Id. at 1909-10.
310. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(23) (1990).
311. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-1-102 (a)(1 1) (LEXIS Repl. 2004).
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Possibly the greatest benefit to estate planners already skilled in the
Rule is that USRAP requires no new learning.315 However, drafters should
be aware that their savings clauses should not contain the "later-of' provi-
sions forbidden by section l(e).3t 6 Examples of simple savings clauses, any
of which will work under USRAP, are the following: (1) "notwithstanding
any provision to the contrary, this trust shall terminate, if it has not already
terminated, twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of the beneficia-
ries of the trust living at the date this instrument becomes effective," '3 17 (2)
"twenty-one years after the death of my last surviving child," or (3) "ninety
years after my death." To avoid litigation outside of USRAP, drafters should
also specify termination dates for options to purchase and rights of first re-
fusal.
VI. CONCLUSION
"The wheel's still in spin,"318 but what changes in tax law and other
factors have wrought so far is basically the withdrawal of trusts from the
coverage of the Rule in about half of the states. How far will this trend go?
Can we expect unanimous abolition of the Rule at some point in the not-so-
distant future? Probably not. First, Congress may do away with the GST tax
exemption, which would remove the major incentive to establish perpetual
trusts. Second, nine states have constitutional provisions prohibiting perpe-
tuities, although Arizona has nonetheless allowed perpetual trusts, and
Wyoming has allowed 1000-year trusts.3 19 What is the opinion of the aver-
age citizen? The only answer to this was stated in Nevada, where the popu-
lace voted strongly against repeal of the Rule.
3 20
This trend has greatly complicated the area of perpetuities law, which
has veered away from the uniformity sought by reformers in the form of
USRAP. Arkansas has chosen to enact USRAP, joining the company of one-
third of the states and benefiting from a twenty-year-old statute that retains
the benefits of the common law Rule while ameliorating its defects. USRAP
will improve Arkansas law. Even so, given the liquidity of most trust assets,
315. Unlike the Arkansas Trust Code, which has established default rules for trusts that
do not expressly waive them. See generally Foster, supra note 112, for an explanation of the
Code.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 271-72 for the discussion of this problem.
317. The word "effective" should be used if the trust is irrevocable; otherwise the word
"irrevocable" should be used because future dispositions under a revocable trust, like disposi-
tions under a will before the death of the testator, may be revoked by the settlor or testator at
any time.
318. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN'
(Columbia Records 1964).
319. See discussion infra app. B (summarizing state constitutions and laws).
320. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
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the increasing trend of settlers to "shop around," and the variation in perpe-
tuities law among the states, estate planners must tread warily and make sure
they stay informed of the latest developments in other states when advising
trust settlors.
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Appendix A: An Act to Adopt the
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
[Note: Arkansas Code section numbers are those from the session law.
Conforming amendments to existing law are omitted. (These concern
perpetual care trusts and the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.) Arkan-
sas has made no changes to USRAP.]
§ 18-3-101. Statutory rule against perpetuities.
(a) A nonvested property interest is valid unless:
(1) when the interest is created, it is certain to vest or termi-
nate no later than 21 years after the death of an individual
then alive; or
(2) the interest either vests or terminates within 90 years after
its creation.
(b) A general power of appointment not presently exercisable because of
a condition precedent is invalid unless:
(1) when the power is created, the condition precedent is cer-
tain to be satisfied or becomes impossible to satisfy no later
than 21 years after the death of an individual then alive; or
(2) the condition precedent either is satisfied or becomes im-
possible to satisfy within 90 years after its creation.
(c) A nongeneral power of appointment or a general testamentary power
of appointment is invalid unless:
(1) when the power is created, it is certain to be irrevocably
exercised or otherwise to terminate no later than 21 years af-
ter the death of an individual then alive; or
(2) the power is irrevocably exercised or otherwise terminates
within 90 years after its creation.
(d) In determining whether a nonvested property interest or a power of
appointment is valid under subdivision (a)(1), (b)(1), or (c)(1) of this
section, the possibility that a child will be born to an individual after the
individual's death is disregarded.
(e) If, in measuring a period from the creation of a trust or other property
arrangement, language in a governing instrument (i) seeks to disallow
the vesting or termination of any interest or trust beyond, (ii) seeks to
postpone the vesting or termination of any interest or trust until, or (iii)
seeks to operate in effect in any similar fashion upon, the later of (A) the
expiration of a period of time not exceeding 21 years after the death of
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the survivor of specified lives in being at the creation of the trust or other
property arrangement or (B) the expiration of a period of time that ex-
ceeds or might exceed 21 years after the death of the survivor of lives in
being at the creation of the trust or other property arrangement, that lan-
guage is inoperative to the extent it produces a period of time that ex-
ceeds 21 years after the death of the survivor of the specified lives.
§ 18-3-102. When nonvested property interest or power of appointment
created.
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) and in § 5(a) of this sec-
tion, the time of creation of a nonvested property interest or a power of
appointment is determined under general principles of property law.
(b) For purposes of this chapter, if there is a person who alone can exer-
cise a power created by a governing instrument to become the unquali-
fied beneficial owner of (i) a nonvested property interest or (ii) a proper-
ty interest subject to a power of appointment described in § 18-3-101(b)
or § 18-3-101(c), the nonvested property interest or power of appoint-
ment is created when the power to become the unqualified beneficial
owner terminates.
(c) For purposes of this chapter, a nonvested property interest or a power
of appointment arising from a transfer of property to a previously funded
trust or other existing property arrangement is created when the non-
vested property interest or power of appointment in the original contribu-
tion was created.
§ 18-3-103. Reformation.
Upon the petition of an interested person, a court shall reform a disposi-
tion in the manner that most closely approximates the transferor's mani-
fested plan of distribution and is within the 90 years allowed by § 18-3-
101(a)(2), § 18-3-101(b)(2), or § 18-3-101(c)(2) if:
(1) a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment
becomes invalid under § 18-3-101;
(2) a class gift is not but might become invalid under § 18-3-
101 and the time has arrived when the share of any class
member is to take effect in possession or enjoyment; or
(3) a nonvested property interest that is not validated by § 18-
3-101(a)(1) can vest but not within 90 years after its creation.
§ 18-3-104. Exclusions From Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities.
Section 18-3-101 does not apply to:
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(1) a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment
arising out of a nondonative transfer, except a nonvested
property interest or a power of appointment arising out of (i) a
premarital or postmarital agreement, (ii) a separation or di-
vorce settlement, (iii) a spouse's election, (iv) a similar ar-
rangement arising out of a prospective, existing, or previous
marital relationship between the parties, (v) a contract to
make or not to revoke a will or trust, (vi) a contract to exer-
cise or not to exercise a power of appointment, (vii) a transfer
in satisfaction of a duty of support, or (viii) a reciprocal trans-
fer;
(2) a fiduciary's power relating to the administration or man-
agement of assets, including the power of a fiduciary to sell,
lease, or mortgage property, and the power of a fiduciary to
determine principal and income;
(3) a power to appoint a fiduciary;
(4) a discretionary power of a trustee to distribute principal
before termination of a trust to a beneficiary having an inde-
feasibly vested interest in the income and principal;
(5) a nonvested property interest held by a charity, govern-
ment, or governmental agency or subdivision, if the non-
vested property interest is preceded by an interest held by
another charity, government, or governmental agency or sub-
division;
(6) a nonvested property interest in or a power of appointment
with respect to a trust or other property arrangement forming
part of a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, health, disabili-
ty, death benefit, income deferral, or other current or deferred
benefit plan for one or more employees, independent contrac-
tors, or their beneficiaries or spouses, to which contributions
are made for the purpose of distributing to or for the benefit
of the participants or their beneficiaries or spouses the proper-
ty, income, or principal in the trust or other property ar-
rangement, except a nonvested property interest or a power of
appointment that is created by an election of a participant or a
beneficiary or spouse; or
(7) a property interest, power of appointment, or arrangement
that was not subject to the common-law rule against perpetui-
ties or is excluded by another statute of this State.
§ 18-3-105. Prospective Application.
(a) Except as extended by subsection (b) of this section, this chapter ap-
plies to a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment that is
2007]
UALR LAW REVIEW
created on or after the effective date of this chapter. For purposes of this
section, a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment created
by the exercise of a power of appointment is created when the power is
irrevocably exercised or when a revocable exercise becomes irrevocable.
(b) If a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment was
created before the effective date of this chapter and is determined in a
judicial proceeding, commenced on or after the effective date of this
chapter, to violate this State's rule against perpetuities as that rule existed
before the effective date of this chapter, a court upon the petition of an
interested person may reform the disposition in the manner that most
closely approximates the transferor's manifested plan to distribution and
is within the limits of the rule against perpetuities applicable when the
nonvested property interest or power of appointment was created.
§18-3-106. Short Title.
This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpe-
tuities.
§ 18-3-107. Uniformity of Application and Construction.
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general pur-
pose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter
among states enacting it.
§ 18-3-108. [Reserved.]
§ 18-3-109. Supersession of common law.
This chapter supersedes the rule of the common law known as the rule
against perpetuities.
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Appendix B: Perpetuities Among the States
This list briefly summarizes perpetuities law in the states. For non-
USRAP states, it briefly describes any dynasty or perpetual trust legislation.
For USRAP states, it notes any major amendments to USRAP and also in-
cludes published decisions in the state, if any, that have construed
USRAP.32 1 If a statute regarding alienation is combined with a perpetuities
statute, it is included here; otherwise it is not included. Also, this list does
not include statutes regarding accumulations.
ALABAMA
Alabama's statutory code states that "[t]he common-law rule against
perpetuities as to land shall be in full force and effect in this state so that the




Alaska adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities effec-
tive in 1996, but it amended USRAP in 1997 to allow perpetual trusts.
31 3
Dissatisfied with perceived ineffectiveness of the statute, in 2000 and 2001
the existing statutes were partially repealed and amended.324 Currently, the
statutes are in two parts. The first part, concerning restrictions on alienabili-
ty, voids future interests that suspend the power of alienation of property for
more than thirty years after lives in being, but not if the future interest is part
of a trust, and the trustee has the power to sell the property, or if a person
alive when the trust is created has the power to terminate it.325 The second
part extends the wait-and-see period of the Rule out to 1000 years for pow-
ers of appointment and interests subject to those powers. 32 6 Alaska's statute
321. A more detailed, historical state-by-state treatment can be found in JOHN A. BORRON,
JR., SIMES & SMITH: THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1412-61 (3d ed. 2004). See also
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 161, § 214; RICHARD R. POWELL, 10 POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY §§ 71.01-75A.08 (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2005).
322. ALA. CODE § 35-4-4 (LexisNexis 1991).
323. Stephen E. Greer, The Alaska Dynasty Trust, 18 ALASKA L. REv. 253, 256 (2001).
This article has an excellent discussion of the problems of the 1997 statute, problems that
statutes in other states arguably have at the present time.
324. Id.; see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.27.051 to 34.27.100 (2004).
325. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.100 (2004). For more discussion of Alaska's law see Sterk,
supra note 2, at 2102.
326. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.051 (2004).
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was carefully crafted to avoid the Delaware Tax Trap.327 One commentator
describes Alaska's law as "a model to emulate. 328
ARIZONA
Article II, section 29 of Arizona's Constitution declares that "[n]o he-
reditary emoluments, privileges, or powers shall be granted or conferred,
and no law shall be enacted permitting any perpetuity or entailment in this
State." Arizona enacted USRAP, slightly amended, effective in 1995.329 The
statute states that it applies "notwithstanding" the common law rule against
perpetuities.33° Despite Arizona's constitution, in 1998, the legislature
amended USRAP so that an interest in a trust whose trustee has the power to
sell the trust property is removed from the scope of any perpetuities rule.3
Thus, if the trustee has an express or implied power to sell trust assets, and if
at least one person living when the trust was created has an unlimited power
to terminate the trust, it is not subject to the Rule and can conceivably last
forever.332
CALIFORNIA
California enacted USRAP in 1991 with minor amendments33 3 and the
addition of two sections. The first states that the lives of individuals selected
to govern the time of vesting may not be so numerous that the evidence of
their deaths is likely to be unreasonably difficult to obtain.334 This section
attempts to remedy one of the criticisms of wait-and-see provisions. The
second seeks to remedy the "unborn widow" problem caused by the Rule by
requiring that an unnamed spouse is deemed to be alive when the interest is
created.335
In 1994, the California Court of Appeals held that perpetual options to
renew in commercial leases were property interests arising out of a non-
donative transfer, and thus not subject to USRAP.3 36
327. ' Greer, supra note 323, at 278-82 (discussing how Alaska's prior law was amended
to avoid federal transfer taxation).
328. Id. at 285.
329. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2901-07 (2005).
330. Id. § 14-2906.
331. Id. § 14-2901(A)(3).
332. 1d.
333. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21200-25 (West Supp. 2007).
334. Id. § 21230.
335. Id. § 21231.
336. See generally Shaver v. Clanton, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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COLORADO
Colorado adopted USRAP in 1991. 337 In 2001, it amended USRAP to
validate nonvested property interests in trust if the trustee had discretion to
distribute at least part of the income or principal to a living person at the
time of the trust's creation.338 In 2002, the Colorado Court of Appeals struck
down what it characterized as a contingent interest in real property that vi-
olated the common law Rule.339 The opinion did not discuss USRAP, even
though the transaction was nondonative, because it was not raised at the trial
level.34° In 2005, after the losing party filed a new lawsuit to reform the
transaction under USRAP, the Colorado Supreme Court applied the doctrine
of res judicata to prevent the deed from being reformed, stating that the par-
ty should have raised the issue in the first suit.
341
In 2006, the Colorado legislature again amended USRAP to extend the
perpetuities period to 1000 years.342 This amendment is partially retroactive,
applying to trust interests and powers created after May 31, 2001, unless a
person holding such an interest or power opts out of retroactivity. 343 The
addition to valid interests added in 2001 was effectively repealed, effective
in 2008. 44 In addition, the new amendments specified when future interests
or powers of appointment created by powers of appointment are created for
purposes of USRAP and the federal tax laws, in an attempt to avoid the De-
laware Tax Trap. 345 The legislators also reinstated a nonvested property in-
terest or power of appointment arising out of a reciprocal transfer under the
Rule's coverage.346 This exclusion had been criticized by Colorado commen-
tators as unclear. 347 Effective July 1, 2008, sections 1 and 4 of USRAP will
337. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-1101-07 (2006).
338. Id. § 15-11-1102.
339. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Argus Real Estate Partners, Inc., 70 P.3d 481 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2002).
340. Id. at 485.
341. See generally Argus Real Estate, Inc. v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 109 P.3d 604
(Colo. 2005).
342. COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-11-1102.5 (2006).
343. Id. § 15-11-1106.5.
344. Id. § 15-11-1102(6).
345. Id. § 15-11-1103.
346. Id. § 15-11-1105.
347. Lucy Marsh, Shouldn't We Just Simplify the RAP?, COLO. LAW., July 2001, at 57.
After the 2001 enactment of USRAP, a trust officer stated how glad he was that he would not
be the person tracking down heirs 100 years from now. Donald R. Thompson II, A Banker's
Perspective on the Repeal of the RAP in Colorado, COLO. LAW., July 2001, at 61. He should
be even more relieved after the passage of the 2006 amendments, which have pushed that
point in time forward another 900 years.
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be repealed.348 These changes will amend USRAP so as to make it unrecog-
nizable.
CONNECTICUT
Connecticut adopted USRAP in 1989. 349 In 2000, in a case in which a
developer had an option to purchase land condemned by eminent domain,
the Connecticut Superior Court held that the Rule did not apply to purchase
options.350 Connecticut has a statute regulating the length of time of pur-
chase options, which terminates them well within the period of the Rule.",
DELAWARE
Delaware was the first state to enact legislation that allowed the estab-
lishment of perpetual trusts after the GST tax exemption was established in
1986.352 It did this by a statute providing that "[n]o interest created in real
property held in trust shall be void by reason of the common law rule
against perpetuities and no interest created in personal property held in trust
shall be void by reason of any rule against perpetuities, whether the common
law rule or otherwise." '353 The statute requires real property owned by a trust
to be distributed after 110 years.354
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The District of Columbia adopted USRAP in 2001, 3 5' amending it in
2006 to exclude from its coverage a trust that expressly opts out of the Rule
and in which the trustee has a power of sale, lease, or mortgage for any pe-
riod of time beyond the period that is required for an interest created under
the trust to vest.
356
348. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-11-1102, 1104 (2006).
349. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-490 to 45a-496 (2004).
350. See generally Town of Newington v. Estate of Young, 777 A.2d 219 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 2000).
351. CONN. GEN. STAT..ANN. § 47-33a(a) (2004).
352. Dukeminier, supra note 74, at 208, n.54.
353. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a) (Supp. 2006).
354. Id. § 503(b).
355. D.C. CODE §§ 19-901-07 (2005).
356. Id. § 19-904(10) (Supp. 2006).
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FLORIDA
Florida adopted USRAP in 1988. 357 In 2000, the legislature amended it
to change the ninety-year wait-and-see period to 360 years, with respect to
any trust created beginning in 2001.358 Also in 2000, another amendment
changed the language of USRAP that provides that it supersedes or repeals
the Rule.359 Florida's new language states that "[t]his section is the sole ex-
pression of any rule against perpetuities or remoteness of vesting in this
state. No common-law rule against perpetuities or remoteness in vesting
shall exist with respect to any interest or power regardless of whether such
interest or power is governed by this section. 36° In 2001, the Florida Court
of Appeals considered whether an option to purchase for an unlimited period
violated the Rule.36' The court noted that, even though the legislature had
intended to abolish the common law Rule, there might be doubt as to wheth-
er enactment of USRAP had actually accomplished that goal.362 However,
the court declined to decide that question, and instead held the option void
because it was an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
3 63
GEORGIA
Georgia adopted USRAP in 1990. 364 In 2001, the Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed a trial court's use of the reformation power granted by
USRAP to reform a trust created before 1990 that "all parties agree violates
the rule against perpetuities. In 2002, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled
that a right of repurchase in a noncommercial transaction was personal to
the holder, and thus did not violate USRAP.3 6 6
HAWAII
Hawaii adopted USRAP in 1992, amending section 4 by omitting sev-
eral of USRAP's exclusions from the Rule, and also omitting section 9 that
states that USRAP supersedes the common law Rule.367 No published Ha-
waiian cases have dealt with USRAP at this time.
357. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.225 (West 1994).
358. Id. § 689.225(2)(0 (West Supp. 2007).
359. Id. § 689.225(7) (West Supp. 2007).
360. Id.
361. See generally Sander v. Ball, 781 So. 527 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001).
362. Id. at 528.
363. Id. at 530-31.
364. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-6-200-06 (1991).
365. See generally Scott v. South Trust Asset Mgmt. Co., 555 S.E.2d 732 (Ga. 2001).
366. See generally Owenby v. Holley, 567 S.E.2d 351 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).




Idaho's statute, enacted in 1957, is captioned "suspension of [the] pow-
er of alienation," and it limits the suspension of the power of alienation of
real property to lives in being plus twenty-five years.368 It abolishes the rule
against perpetuities with respect to both real and personal property.369 It re-
quires the reformation of any trusts violating its provisions and abolishes the
presumption that adults can have children at any age.37° Idaho's statute is the
oldest one existing that allows perpetual trusts.
ILLINOIS
In 1969, Illinois adopted a lengthy "statute concerning perpetuities."371
As amended in 1997, it allows "qualified perpetual trusts" to be created be-
ginning in 1998, either by new instruments or by amendment to existing
trusts and exercise of a power of appointment granted by an instrument ex-
ecuted or amended beginning in 1998.372 The trust must state that the Rule
does not apply, and the power of the trustee to transfer trust property must
not be limited to the period of the Rule.373 The statute also exempts some
interests from the Rule's coverage, such as leases, options, and rights of first
refusal, but it limits their terms.3 4 Otherwise, the common law Rule applies,
but with some reforms remedying some of the excesses of the Rule, such as
the unborn widow and the slothful executor, among others.375
INDIANA
Indiana adopted USRAP in 1991, with minor amendments.376 In 2006,
the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that a right of first refusal arising out of a
donative transfer was subject to USRAP, but that the right of first refusal in
the instant case did not violate USRAP because it was personal to the hold-
ers and would terminate at their deaths.377
368. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (2003).
369. Id.
370. Id.





376. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-17-8-1-6 (LexisNexis 2002).
377. In re Estate of Owen, 855 N.E.2d 603, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
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IOWA
Iowa has a statutory Rule that combines the common law Rule with
both wait-and-see and cy pres provisions.378 When applying the Rule, Iowa's
statute requires courts to measure the period of the Rule by actual events,
rather than possible events.379 The statute sets out a default pool of possible
validating lives if no others can be found.38°
KANSAS
Kansas adopted USRAP in 1992.381 In 2004, the Kansas Court of Ap-
peals decided that because USRAP does not apply the Rule to nonvested
interests created in a commercial, nondonative transfer, a preferential rights
provision was not invalid.382 The losing party argued that USRAP was un-
constitutionally enacted in Kansas because it was part of a uniform laws bill
that was not accurately labeled.383 The court held USRAP's enactment to be
constitutional.&4
KENTUCKY
Kentucky follows the common law version of the Rule, as codified.385
In addition, Kentucky has both wait-and-see and cy pres provisions.3 86 The
former measures the period of the Rule by actual, rather than possible,
events and limits possible validating lives to those that have a causal rela-
tionship to the vesting or failure of the interest.387 The latter requires that
interests that violate the Rule be judicially reformed to bring them within the
Rule's limits.3 8 However, a 1987 court of appeals decision stated that de-
spite the cy pres provision, "it does not follow that all violations of the rule
against perpetuities ... will be cured or remedied by the application of it."
389
378. IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.68 (West 1992).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-3401-08 (2005).
382. Larson Operating Co. v. Petroleum, Inc., 84 P.3d 626, 633 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
383. Id.
384. Id. at 634.
385. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.215 to .216 (LexisNexis 2002).
386. Id. § 381.216.
387. Id.
388. Id.




Louisiana has never recognized the Rule, although it does have a kind
of trust law9 ° and a rule prohibiting "substitutions," which seems to require
immediate vesting of remainders, which one commentator says advances
some of the same policies as the Rule.3 l
MAINE
Maine applies the common law Rule, but has statutorily modified it by
adding a wait-and-see provision.392 Maine has also added a statutory provi-
sion allowing courts to change age contingencies to twenty-one years if that
will allow them to validate future interests.3 93 In 1999, Maine once again
amended the Rule so that it did not apply to a trust if the trust contained an
opt out provision and the trustee had the power to transfer property beyond
the period of the Rule.394
MARYLAND
Maryland also applies the common law Rule, along with statutory pro-
visions adopting wait-and-see and cy pres for age contingencies to twenty-
one years.3 95 In 1998, the legislature amended the statute to remove from the
coverage of the Rule a trust that opts out and in which the trustee has the
power to transfer property beyond the period of the Rule.396
MASSACHUSETTS
Massachusetts adopted USRAP in 1989, with minor amendments. 97
The legislature also added sections concerning options, preemptive rights,
leases, easements, and defeasible fees, limiting most of them to thirty years'
duration.3 98 In 1997, in a case concerning a trust, the trust provided that in
case the settlors' children did not survive them, but left issue, then the de-
ceased children's shares should go to their issue when they reached the age
390. See, e.g., David Gruning, Bayou State Bijuralism: Common Law and Civil Law in
Louisiana, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 437, 456-57 (2004).
391. Appel, supra note 42, at 264, n.25.
392. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101 (1999).
393. Id. § 102.
394. Id. § 101-A (Supp. 2006).
395. MD. CODEANN., EST. &TRUSTS § 11-103 (West 2002).
396. Id. § 11-102.
397. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, §§ 1-11 (West Supp. 2007).
398. Id. §§ 5, 7.
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of thirty.3 99 The trustee asked for reformation of this provision, arguing that
it violated the Rule.400 The Supreme Judicial Court held that no reformation




Michigan adopted USRAP in 1988.402 It amended USRAP slightly,
leaving out section 1(e) and omitting some of USRAP's exclusions from the
Rule.403
MINNESOTA
Minnesota adopted USRAP in 1987, effective January 1, 1991.404
MISSISSIPPI
Mississippi case law applies the common law Rule, along with judicial-
ly adopted wait-and-see" 5 and reform, implying savings clauses into instru-
ments that would otherwise violate the Rule. °
MISSOURI
Missouri follows the common law Rule, as modified by statutory re-
formation.4 7 However, in 2001, the legislature removed trusts from the
scope of the Rule if the trustee has the power to transfer trust property
beyond the Rule period.40 8
399. Pond v. Pond, 678 N.E.2d 1321, 1322 (Mass. 1997).
400. Id. at 1323.
401. Id. at 1324.
402. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.71 to 554.78 (West 2005).
403. Id.
404. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 501A.01 to .07 (West 2002).
405. Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Sun Operating Ltd. P'ship, 747 So. 2d 260, 265
(Miss. 1999).
406. In re Estate of Anderson, 541 So. 2d 423, 429-30 (Miss. 1989).
407. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.555 (West 2000).




Article XIII, section 6 of the Montana Constitution states that "[n]o
perpetuities shall be allowed except for charitable purposes. ' 4° Montana
adopted USRAP in 1989.41°
NEBRASKA
Nebraska enacted USRAP in 1989.411 In 2002, the legislature amended
USRAP to exclude from its coverage a trust that expressly opts out and in
which the trustee has the power to transfer property for a period of time
beyond the Rule.412 In 2005, the Nebraska Court of Appeals refused to ad-
dress the question of whether a right of first refusal, which was subject to
the common law Rule but expressly excluded from coverage under USRAP,
could still be invalidated by the operation of the common law Rule.4 3 In-
stead, the court ruled that the right of first refusal was limited to a period of
only seven months, and thus did not violate the common law Rule, even
assuming it applied.41 4
NEVADA
Article 15, section 4 of the Nevada Constitution states that "[n]o perpe-
tuities shall be allowed except for eleemosynary purposes. '4 5 Nevada
adopted USRAP in 1987.416 In 1999 and 2001, the Nevada legislature ap-
proved a joint resolution to amend the constitution, since such a resolution
must pass two consecutive sessions, and in December of 2002, the amend-
ment repealing the constitutional prohibition of noncharitable perpetuities
was submitted to the voters.417 During the 2005 legislative session, the legis-
409. MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 6.
410. MONT. CODE ANN, §§ 72-2-1001-07 (2005).
411. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-2001-08 (LexisNexis 2004).
412. Id. § 76-2005.
413. See generally Greenhall Invs., LLC v. Wiese Dev. Corp., 706 N.W.2d 552 (Neb. Ct.
App. 2005).
414. Id. at 559-60.
415. NEV. CONST. art. XV, § 4.
416. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.103 to.1039 (West 2000).
417. The ballot contained an explanation of the question and "pro" and "con" arguments
for the repeal. The "pro" argument was longer in length and cited the Rule's age, its difficulty
of application, and the fact that trustee powers allow transferability of property. The "pro"
argument also contrasted Nevada with other states that had already changed their laws and
claimed that enactment would be "economically beneficial" to Nevada. The "con" argument
mentioned the Rule's usefulness against dead-hand control over land and cautioned that
enactment of the repeal would mean that in the future the legislature might restrict transfera-
bility of real property. Nevada Secretary of State, available at
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lature amended USRAP twice, first substituting 150 years for the ninety-
year wait-and-see period, then replacing 150 years with 365 years.418
NEW HAMPSHIRE
New Hampshire follows the common law Rule. In 2003, legislators ex-
cepted trusts that expressly opt out from the Rule's coverage if they give the
trustee the power to transfer property beyond the period of the Rule.4 9
NEW JERSEY
New Jersey enacted USRAP in 1991.420 In the same year, the New Jer-
sey Superior Court ruled that, even though USRAP was not retroactive,
nonetheless, a right of first refusal that had been executed before the enact-
ment of USRAP and would have fallen under the common law Rule in force
at the time, was not invalid because USRAP abrogated the common law.42'
In 1999, New Jersey repealed USRAP, with the result that there is no rule
against perpetuities of any type in that state applying to interests created
after 1999.422 Future interests may be void if they suspend the power of alie-
nation for longer than the permissible period, which is the period of the
common law Rule. 423 However, the power of alienation is not suspended by
a trust if the trustee has the power to sell, or if living persons have the unli-
mited power to terminate the trust.
4 24
NEW MEXICO
New Mexico adopted USRAP in 1992.425
http://accessclarkcounty.com/election/General_2002/Statequestion 5.pdf (last visited Jan. 1,
2006). Of the initiative, the Reno News and Review of October 31, 2002 stated "We don't
think dead people or immortal corporations should be able to tie up land," and urged voters to
vote no. Reno News and Review, available at
http://www.newsreview.com/reno/Content?oid=oid%3A 19072 (last visited Jan. 1, 2007).
418. 2005 NEV. STAT. 163; § 2; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.1031, 111.1035 (West
Supp. 2007).
419. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564:24 (LexisNexis 2006).
420. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2F-1 to 2F-8 (West 2003).
421. Juliano & Sons Enters., Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 593 A.2d 814, 814 (N.J. Su-
per. App. Div. 1991).
422. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2F-9 (West 2003).
423. Id. § 46:2F-10.
424. Id.




The New York perpetuities statute expressly couples remoteness in
vesting with suspension of the power of alienation, stating that a future in-
terest is void if it "suspend[s] the absolute power of alienation by any limita-
tion or condition for a longer period than lives in being at the creation of the
estate and a term of not more than twenty-one years. 426 New York also re-
forms age contingencies to twenty-one years if they will otherwise violate
the Rule.427 New York's statutes also abrogate the doctrines of the "unborn
widow," "slothful executor," "precocious toddler," and "fertile octogena-
rian," and create the presumption that the creator of an interest intends it to
vest or fail within the period of the Rule.428 Currently, New York is consi-
dering adoption of USRAP.429
NORTH CAROLINA
Article I, section 34 of North Carolina's Constitution declares that
"[p]erpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and
shall not be allowed.' 430 In 1995, North Carolina adopted USRAP with mi-
nor amendments.43' In 2002, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a
restrictive covenant that a purchaser pay an "availability fee" to a vendor did
not fall under either USRAP or the common law Rule.432
NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota adopted USRAP in 1991 with minor amendments.433
OHIO
Ohio statutes adopt the common law Rule, as reformed by cy pres and
wait-and-see. The statute gives no guidance as to which lives should be
used.434 Effective in 1999, the legislature amended perpetuities law to ex-
empt from the Rule property held in trust if the instrument opts out of the
426. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney 2002).
427. Id. § 9-1.2.
428. Id. § 9-1.3.
429. N.Y. Assem. Bill 598,229th Leg. (N.Y. 2006).
430. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34.
431. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15-22 (West 2000).
432. Rich, Rich & Nance v. Carolina Constr. Corp., 558 S.E.2d 77, 81 (N.C. 2002).
433. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-02-27.1 to -01-27.5 (1999).
434. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2131.08 (LexisNexis 2002).
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Rule, and if either the trustee has unlimited power to sell, or at least one
person has the power to terminate the trust.435
OKLAHOMA
Article II, section 32 of Oklahoma's Constitution declares that
"[p]erpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free govern-
ment, and shall never be allowed, nor shall the law of primogeniture or en-
tailments ever be in force in this State." Although Oklahoma has not codi-
fied the common law Rule, its statutes require reformation of any interest
that violates the Rule.436 Oklahoma courts apply the common law Rule.437
OREGON
Oregon adopted USRAP, effective in 1990.438
PENNSYLVANIA
Historically, Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt the wait-and-see
doctrine.439 In 2006, the Pennsylvania legislature amended statutory law so
that no future interests created beginning in 2007 could be void as perpetui-
ties."40 Neither could any "direction or authorization to accumulated in-
come" be void."' This legislation abolishes the Rule.
RHODE ISLAND
Rhode Island applied the common law Rule, as modified by wait-and-
see and cy pres, but in 1999, the legislature amended the statutes to abolish
the Rule." 2
SOUTH CAROLINA
In 1987, South Carolina became the first state to adopt USRAP."43 In
1997, the South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that a perpetual right of
435. Id. § 2131.09(B).
436. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 60, §§ 75-77 (West 1994).
437. In re Estate of Crowl, 737 P.2d 911, 914 (Okla. 1987); Producers Oil Co. v. Gore,
610 P.2d 772, 774 (Okla. 1980).
438. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.950 to .975 (West 2005).
439. See supra text accompanying note 49.
440. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107.1 (2007).
441. Id.
442. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (Supp. 2005).
443. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-10-80 (2007).
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first refusal in a deed executed in 1955 was void under the common law
Rule.' No mention of USRAP was made except for a citation to its reform
provision, with no discussion."5
SOUTH DAKOTA
South Dakota statutes enacted in 1983 provide that the Rule is not in
force in that state, but it has retained statutes restricting the suspension of
the absolute power of alienation for more than lives in being plus thirty
years." 6 However, trusts in which either the trustee has the power to sell or
there is a living person who can terminate the trust do not suspend the power
of alienation.447
TENNESSEE
Article I, section 22 of Tennessee's Constitution declares that
"[p]erpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free State and
shall not be allowed."" 8 Tennessee adopted USRAP in 1994. 449
TEXAS
Article I, section 26 of Texas's Constitution declares that
"[p]erpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free govern-
ment, and shall never be allowed, nor shall the law of primogeniture or en-
tailments ever be in force in this State. '450 Texas applies the common law
Rule, as modified statutorily by the cypres doctrine.451
UTAH
Utah adopted USRAP in 1998.452 In 2003, the legislature deleted "Uni-
form" from the title of the statute and amended it to extend the period of the
Rule to 1000 years.453
444. Webb v. Reames, 485 S.E.2d 384, 385 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
445. Id.
446. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-5-1-8 (1999).
447. Id. § 43-5-4 (1999).
448. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 22.
449. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-1-201-08 (2004).
450. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 26.
451. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.043 (Vernon 2004).
452. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1201-08 (Supp. 2006).
453. Id § 1203.
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VERMONT
Vermont applies the common law Rule, as statutorily modified by both
the cy pres and wait-and-see doctrines. The statute contains no guidance as
to which lives may be used as possible validating lives.454
VIRGINIA
Virginia adopted USRAP in 2000.455 During the same year, Virginia al-
so enacted an "opt-out" statute that allows trusts, personal property held in
trusts, or powers of appointment over personal property held in trust to es-
cape the coverage of the Rule as long as the trust instrument expressly so
provides.45 6
WEST VIRGINIA
In 1992, West Virginia adopted USRAP. 4s7 In 2005, the West Virginia
Supreme Court held that USRAP did not apply to a charitable trust.58
WASHINGTON
Prior to 1991, Washington had the common law Rule, but with statuto-
ry opportunities for cy pres and wait-and-see in the case of trusts. In 2001,
the legislature enacted a statute moving the perpetuities period to 150 years
from the effective date of the instrument. 4 9 For testamentary trusts and re-
vocable inter vivos trusts, this is the death of the settlor. 460 For irrevocable
trusts, it is the date of the execution of the trust." This perpetuities statute
applies only to trusts.462
WISCONSIN
Wisconsin statutes state that the common law Rule is not in force, but
they invalidate future interests or trusts that suspend the power of alienation
for lives in being plus thirty years. However, the statute also provides that if
454. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1998).
455. VA. CODEANN. §§ 55-12.1 to -12.6 (2003).
456. Id. § 55-13.3.
457. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1A-1-8 (LexisNexis 2005).
458. United Bank, Inc. v. Blosser, 624 S.E.2d 815, 823 (W. Va. 2005).
459. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.98.140 (West 2006).
460. Id. § 11.98.160.
461. Id.
462. Id. §§ 11.98.130to.160.
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the trustee has the power to sell, or if persons in being have an unlimited
power to terminate the trust, the power of alienation is not suspended.463
WYOMING
Article I, section 30 of Wyoming's Constitution declares that
"[p]erpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and
shall not be allowed."' In 1949, Wyoming enacted the common law Rule
into statutory law, in an act titled the "Model Rule Against Perpetuities
Act. 465 However, in 2003, new legislation exempted trusts from the cover-
age of the Rule if the trust contains express opt-out language, terminates
within 1000 years, and does not own real property.466 The trust must be go-
verned by Wyoming law and have other connections to Wyoming. 7 Also,
any real property owned by the trust is still subject to the Rule."8
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 2001).
WYo. CONST. art. I, § 30.
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Appendix C: Index to USRAP Examples
(References are to example numbers)
Age exceeding twenty-one .................................................................... 14, 16
Charitable interests ................................................................................ 28, 29
Children, afterborn ................................................................................. 21
C lass gifts ............................................................................................... 14,15
Contingent remainders ........................................................................... 14, 15
Cy p res ............................................................................................. 25, 26, 27
Future interests, time of creation ........................................................... 23, 24
Great-grandchildren, gifts to ................................................................. 15
Powers of appointment, fiduciary, validity ........................................... 18
Powers of appointment, general nontestamentary, exercise ................... 19
Powers of appointment, general nontestamentary, validity .................... 16
Powers of appointment, general testamentary, exercise .......................... 20
Powers of appointment, general testamentary, validity .......................... 17
Powers of appointment, nongeneral, exercise ....................................... 20
Powers of appointment, nongeneral, validity ........................................ 17
R etroactivity .......................................................................................... 30
Savings clauses ...................................................................................... 22

